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Actions and Remedies Against Government Units
and Public Officers for Nonfeasance
PAUL T. WANGERIN*
INTRODUCTION
Two fundamental developments run through the expansion of
modern government and the evolution of governmental tort liabil-
ity. First, as government becomes larger and assumes greater res-
ponsibilities, the methods for implementing these expanded public
purposes become substantially more complex than the methods
used at an earlier time. As the scope of government changes, what
may have been an effective mechanism for implementing govern-
mental policy at one point in the political development of a society
may not be so at a later stage. The second development is an
increase in the social consciousness of modern states, a development
exemplified by the expanding notion that injury should be compen-
sated. This development is reflected in the gradual broadening of
private tort liability,' and the similar increase in public liability.
As government becomes larger the judicial methods used to help
implement the purposes of government have changed: suits against
the government have dramatically increased. Two aspects of large
* Associate, Winston & Strawn, Chicago, Illinois. A.B. 1969, University of Missouri. J.D.
1978, The John Marshall Law School. Past clerk to Justice Howard C. Ryan, Supreme Court
of Illinois.
1. This broadening is reflected in the movement from trespass to case as a ground of
recovery at common law. This transition involved a movement beyond a strict examination
of the immediate events and persons precipitating an injury. In trespass, originally, the
tortfeasor was liable only if his act was directly' connected to an injury; the early courts did
not deal with extended causation, that is, injury removed from a direct contact with the act.
Later, the restrictions of the early writs gave way to broader liability as the courts attempted
to avoid the limitations inherent in direct causation. Trespass on the case replaced trespass
and extended causation created additional liability. A crucial factor, rarely expressed by the
courts, was added: in trespass, the direct act/injury requirement strictly limited the number
of potential victims; in trespass on the case, however, the number of victims was so limited
because the injury could potentially occur to numerous different people. Therefore, as the
number of potential victims expanded, the courts were forced to place some new form of
restriction on the right to recover for injury. This new restriction was gradually formulated
into the traditional tests of negligence; namely, duty, breach of duty, injury, and proximate
cause. In recent years private tort liability has taken another broadening step as the law of
negligence moved into the area of strict liability for certain types of acts and products.
Public tort law, that is, recovery from the government for injury caused by governmental
unit or public officers, has expanded in a manner corresponding to that of private tort law.
As private liability expanded in a series of hesitant steps, public liability has broadened in a
similar manner at a later time.
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government have precipitated this change. First, when government
was small the judicial mechanism most appropriate for encouraging
government efficiency was a restriction on the possibility of individ-
ual suits against the state. Suits impeded the activities of early
governmental units. However, with modern government extremely
large and cumbersome, and with high level bureaucrats often iso-
lated from day-to-day governmental operations, the courts are in-
creasingly inclined to hold that individual suits against the govern-
ment are necessary to prod the public bureaucracies into at least
attempting to accomplish the purposes that government has set for
itself. The second aspect of modern government which justifies ex-
panding liability is the capability of large institutions, like govern-
ment or insurers, to spread throughout society the cost of compen-
sating injury. It is more fair to disperse the cost of compensation
among numerous taxpayers than to deny recovery and force the
injured plaintiff to shoulder the entire burden. This balancing of
interests is a compelling reason to allow increased recovery.2
Moreover, as government grows larger, it can be expected to cause
more injury. Even if by only failing to do what it says it will do,
modern governments can cause serious injury as people come to
expect that the government will accomplish its set purposes. In fact,
because government attempts so much more today than it did in the
past, it is increasingly likely that injury will be caused not so much
by the government doing something wrong but by its failing to do
something. This tortious failure to act by the government or a public
officer is the problem of public nonfeasance. 3
2. Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263, 270 (1937);
McLachlan, Democratizing the Administrative Process: Toward Increased Responsiveness,
13 ARIz. L.REv. 835, 846-47 (1971); Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerg-
ing Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
See also Dugan, Standing, The 'New Property,' and The Costs of Welfare: Dilemmas in
America and West German Provider-Administration, 45 WASH.L.REv. 497, 521 (1970).
3. Attempts to define nonfeasance or to adequately distinguish it from malfeasance are
almost hopeless. Distinctions between the three types of activities evaporate when real cases
are confronted. In theory, there is a distinction between "nonfeasance" and "misfeasance"
or "malfeasance"; this distinction is often of great importance in determining an agent's
liability to third persons. "Nonfeasance" means the total omission or failure of an agent to
enter upon the performance of some distinct duty or undertaking which he has agreed with
his principal to do; "misfeasance" means the improper doing of an act which the agent might
lawfully do, or, in other words, it is the performing of his duty to his principal in such a
manner as to infringe upon the rights and privileges of third persons; and "malfeasance" is a
doing of an act which he ought not to do at all. Owens v. Nichols, 139 Ga. 475, 77 S.E. 635
(1913); Annot. 20 A.L.R. 97, 99-101 (1922) (supplemented in 99 A.L.R. 408 (1933)).
In this article, the term "public nonfeasance" will include the failure to act by both
government itself and by its employees. See generally Commercial News Co. v. Beard, 116
Ill. App. 501 (1904)(non-enforcement of law is misfeasance not nonfeasance); Schumacher v.
Governmental Nonfeasance
This article will trace the development of governmental liability
for nonfeasance. Because of the complexity of the problem of public
nonfeasance, this subject will be approached by examining three
questions revolving around the concept of duty. First, is there duty?
* If so, who owes the duty? Then, to whom is this duty owed? Duty
is the central concern in actions for public nonfeasance; rarely do
the courts go beyond the questions of duty. The article will also
study the bases of the various public immunities to illustrate the
policies militating against recovery from the government. Finally,
cases from the most litigated areas of nonfeasance will be examined
to explore the possibility of applying concepts from one area to
justify recovery in another.
One final point must be stressed. The law of public liability is
undergoing massive and rapid change. No attempt has been made
in this paper to state the precise modern law in any particular
jurisdiction; in fact, in many situations reference is made primarily
to long-forgotten cases. Modern law on point can be readily found.
It is hoped that the historical perspective supplied herein can be
helpful in interpreting and understanding the modern cases.
Is THERE A DuTY?
The Application of "Duty" to Actions for Nonfeasance
Professor Prosser suggests that the term "duty" be reserved for
the problem of that "relation between individuals which imposes
upon one a legal obligation for the benefit of another."' Although
circumstances change, duty remains constant: the defendant must
conform his conduct to the "legal standard of reasonable conduct
in light of the apparent risk."5 If the defendant's failure to conform
to the standard proximately causes injury to the plaintiff, the defen-
dant is negligent and may be liable.
In a nonfeasance case, the failure to conform consists of inaction
when there is a duty to act. A moral duty is usually insufficient.'
Liability may arise, however, when a legal duty has been imposed,7
State ex rel. Furlong, 78 Nev. 167, 370 P.2d 209 (1962); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS §29.10 at 1645 n.39 (1956); James, Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their
Officers, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 610, 647 n.218 (1955)(failure of county assessor to properly perform
certain statutory duties constituted nonfeasance, not misfeasance).
4. W. PaossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §53, at 324 (4th ed. 1971)[hereinafter
cited as PROSSER].
5. Id.
6. F. POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 11 (12th ed. 1923).
7. See generally J. GRIFFITH & H. STREET, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 255-57 (4th
ed. 1967); H. STREET, GOVERNMENTAL LIABILIr 39-40 (1953). For a general discussion of duty
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when there has been a consciously designed purpose not to act,'
when one alters natural conditions and subsequently fails to repair
the alterations," or when a person engages in other affirmative con-
duct which causes injury at a later time.10
Courts appear to have more difficulty finding a duty owed in a
nonfeasance case than in other tort cases. In the latter type, the
plaintiff alleges he was hurt by the defendant's act. In that case,
there is a clear connection between the defendant's conduct and
plaintiff's injury. In a nonfeasance case, however, the defendant has
done nothing. Courts may have conceptual difficulties linking an
injury with defendant's inaction. Some method of connecting the
injury with the failure to act is needed.
One important connecting element looked to by the courts is the
plaintiff's reliance on the completion of activities undertaken by the
defendant. As early as 1401, in Watson v. Brinth," liability was
placed on a quasi-public officer who had undertaken a task but
failed to complete it. Even at that date the courts realized that
reliance was placed by individuals upon people who voluntarily
undertook actions and then failed to carry them out. Five hundred
years after Watson, Justice Cardozo set out the standard for deter-
mining when liability would attach once an activity had been un-
dertaken:
If the conduct has gone forward to such a stage that inaction would
commonly result, not negatively merely in withholding a benefit,
but positively or actively in working an injury, there exists a rela-
tionship out of which arises a duty to go forward . . . . The ques-
tion always is whether the imputative wrongdoer has advanced to
such a point as to have launched an instrument of force or harm,
or has stopped where inaction is at most a refusal to become an
instrument for good. 2
imposed by statute or other means, see 63 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations §§748-49, 752
(1950).
8. The concept of an intentional decision not to act is discussed extensively in Hale, Prima
Facie Torts, Combination, and Non-feasance, 46 COLUM.L.REv. 196, 217 (1946).
9. 1 T. BEVENS, NEGLIGENCE IN LAW 353-54 (2d ed. 1895).
10. PRossER, supra note 5, §56 at 347.
11. Y.B. 2 Hen. IV, 3B (1401), cited in Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84, 97 (N.Y. 1809)(repair
of house).
12. H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 163, 159 N.E. 896, 898 (1928).
See Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263, 266-69 (1936).
See also James, Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U.CHI.L.REv.
610, 627-28 (1955); Note, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers in New York, 28 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 265 (1954). For additional cases imposing liability see United States v. Gavagan, 280
F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 933 (1961)(undertook but failed to complete
rescue at sea); Shannon v. City of Anchorage, 429 P.2d 17 (Alas. 1967)(failure to provide safe
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Governmental Nonfeasance
Where the courts have been unable to find that the injured victim
relied on action undertaken by the government, however, decisions
imposing liability for nonfeasance have attempted to find duty in a
different manner, perhaps by creating a presumption of duty. One
of the earliest cases involving liability for public nonfeasance,
Yelding v. Fay, ,3 concerned the failure of a public official to keep a
bull and boar for public use. The defendant was ordered by the court
to prove that he had done a particular job or to prove that no duty
existed to do that job. He was required to prove that no one had
relied on his keeping the animals for public use. The plaintiff did
not have to prove a duty existed; the defendant was required to
prove it did not. Public expectation of action created a presumption
of duty and thus potential liability for failure to carry out the duty.
At times, courts also have been able to find a duty without regard
to plaintiff's reliance. Originally, some alternative method of over-
coming the conceptual problem of liability for inaction was needed.
In Earl of Shrewsbury's Case" the court found that the failure to act
was logically connected to a resulting tort, one set in motion by the
nonfeasance. 5 Thus, the court imposed liability even though it
agreed that the failure to act was not itself tortious.
Other courts have not relied on the resulting tort approach.'" In
Amy v. Supervisors'7 the Supreme Court said that a governmental
officer would be liable for failing to levy a tax. The court implied
that the failure to act was in itself a positive act." This rationale
was followed in a New York case, Slavin v. State, 1 in which the
access to dock); Town of Dublin v. State ex rel. Kirpatrick, 198 Ind. 164, 152 N.E. 812
(1926)(failure to levy taxes to pay for construction project); Bowden v. Kansas City, 69 Kan.
587, 77 P. 573 (1904)(failure to provide safe place for fireman to work); Tholkes v. Decock,
125 Minn. 507, 147 N.W. 648 (1914)(agreed to repair culvert and then failed to do so); Adsit
v. Brady, 4 Hill 630 (N.Y. 1843)(officer failed to remove barge from canal).
13. 72 Eng. Rep. 626 (K.B. 1596)(reported in French). This case is discussed briefly in
Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as A Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217,
224 n.8 (1908).
14. 77 Eng. Rep. 798 (K.B. 1693).
15. Id. at 805-06.
16. But see notes 132-133 infra and accompanying text.
17. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 136 (1870).
18. Id. at 138. Although the Court did not reach constitutional claims in this case, it
appears that the failure to act may have been a deprivation of rights without due process.
But see Morrell v. City of Phoenix, 16 Ariz. 511,147 P. 732 (1915)(charter provision immuniz-
ing city from liability for nonfeasance held constitutionally valid); Note, Damage Remedies
Against Municipalities for Constitutional Violations, 89 HARv. L. REv. 922, 954 (1975)(non-
feasance generally not a constitutional violation).
19. 249 App. Div. 72, 291 N.Y.S. 721 (1936). But see Drzewiccki v. City of Buffalo, 51 App.
Div. 2d 870, 380 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1976), stating that ample authority exists in New York for
denying liability for nonfeasance.
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state was held liable after failing to cancel a police bulletin that had
mistakenly broadcast an incorrect license number. A police officer
had pursued a car with the mistakenly-transmitted plate number
and had caused a fatal crash. The court reasoned that the police had
a duty to correct the mistake."0 The failure to act was both a tort in
itself and connected to a resulting tort.
Numerous courts have not been convinced by the rationale of
these cases, however. Two cases with only a tenuous connection
between failure to act and subsequent injury illustrate that courts
often feel that they must draw the line somewhere when establishing
a public duty. In the Massachusetts decision of Trum v. Paxton,2
a city was held not to have owed a duty when a plaintiff's cows died
after eating poisonous weeds cut but not picked up by public offi-
cers. Stressing the fiscal limitations of the city, the Trum court
indicated that there must be something more than a specific and
direct connection between the failure to act and the resulting injury.
If a city could be liable for failing to complete the act of cutting
grass, it could be connected in some fashion to almost any injury
suffered by anyone who has any contact with the government. 22
20. Other cases imposing liability on the basis of the nonfeasance or failing to provide safe
conditions for people include: United States v. Hull, 195 F.2d 64 (1st Cir. 1952)(postal officers
failed to install window securely over counter; assumption of duty to act imposes liability for
failure to complete); Stribling v. Chicago Housing Auth., 34 Ill. App. 3d 551, 340 N.E.2d 47
(1975)(governmental unit liable after failing to prevent burglars from drilling through walls
of vacant apartments into plaintiffs home).
21. 329 Mass. 434, 109 N.E.2d 116 (1952). But c.f. Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction
Finance Corp., 306 U.S. 381 (1939)(before Federal Tort Claims Act, Supreme Court implied
that government might be liable for failing to feed cattle which it had contracted to feed).
22. Cases which did not find sufficient connection between public nonfeasance and the
plaintiff's injury and which allowed actions against the government or public officer include:
Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969), cert denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969) (state failed to
release man from jail for at least seven months after all indictments against him had been
dismissed); Lee v. State, 490 P.2d 1206 (Alas. 1971)(police officer failed to aid woman whose
arm was grabbed by lioness); Littler v. Jayne, 124 Ill. 123, 16 N.E. 374 (1888)(officer failed
to advertise for lowbid contracts given for electrobronzed statues of public figures held null
and void); People ex rel. Chamberlain v. Trustees of Schools, 319 Ill. App. 370, 49 N.E.2d
666 (1943)(board failed to hold hearings); Serpass v. Margiotta, 59 So.2d 492 (La.App.
1952)(dog catcher failed to destroy rabid dog); White v. State, 199 Misc. 728, 101 N.Y.S.2d
702 (Ct.C1.1950) (state did not release prisoner until ten months after term expired); Ferguson
v. Kinnoul, 8 Eng. Rep. 412 (H.L. 1842) (presbytery failed to accept qualified minister for
available position).
Cases which have not imposed liability on the government include: Wheeldon v. United
States, 184 F. Supp. 81 (N.D. Cal. 1960)(failure to remove wrecks from navigable waters);
Upchurch v. Clinton County, 330 S.W.2d 428 (Ky. 1969)(failure to catch stray dogs-officer
liable but county immune); Decarlo v. Borough of Cliffside Park, 86 N.J. Super. 169, 206 A.2d
206 (1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 972 (1967) (failure to remove one-way street sign from corner
causing loss of business); Wrape v. North Carolina State Highway Comm'n, 263 N.C. 499,
139 S.E.2d 570 (1965)(failure to prevent erosion; statute had been changed deleting word
Governmental Nonfeasance
The Supreme Court also dealt recently with the tenuous nature
of public nonfeasance in Hibi v. Immigration & Naturalization
Service. 3 In Hibi, the plaintiff, a Philippine national who had
served with the United States Army, contended that the govern-
ment had failed to notify him immediately after the second world
war of a change in the law allowing him to become a United States
citizen without satisfying certain residency requirements. The
plaintiff also alleged that the Immigration Service had failed to
provide a representative in the Philippines after the war to explain
citizenship rights. The plaintiff, unable to become a citizen due to
a subsequent change in the law, alleged injury by these failures to
act. The Court was unconvinced. Reasoning that the government
did not owe Hibi a duty to inform him of the law or to provide a
representative to help him apply for citizenship, the Court con-
cluded that the connection between omission and injury was too
attenuated to allow recovery in an action brought more than twenty
years after the alleged failure to act. The government was obligated
to let Hibi become a citizen but was not obligated to tell him he
could do so.
Areas in which the Duty is Limited: Failure to Legislate or Enforce
Laws and Discretionary Functions
There are also situations where the government's duty to act is
limited regardless of the connection between its omission and plain-
tiff's injury. For example, courts generally will not impose a duty
upon a legislative body to enact or repeal a law.2" The practical
inability to compel action, or the political question doctrine, pre-
cludes the courts from interfering with the legislative process. In
1979, however, the Illinois Supreme Court broke with the majority
view and held that the Illinois Constitution placed an affirmative
duty upon the legislature to act.
In Client Follow Up Co. v. Hynes15 the court was considering a
"omission" from waiver of tort immunity); Doughty v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 321
Pa. 136, 184 A. 93 (1936)(failure to prevent trolley from running wrong way on one-way street).
23. 414 U.S. 5, rehearing denied, 414 U.S. 1104 (1973).
24. E.g., Shipley v. City of Arroyo Grande, 92 Cal. App. 2d 748, 208 P.2d 51 (1949)(not
liable for failure to repeal ordinance which permitted 'diagonal parking); Jones v. City of
Williamsburg, 97 Va. 722, 34 S.E. 883 (1900)(city not liable for failing to pass antibiking
ordinance); UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE:
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GovERNmENT AGENCIES 76 (1968) [reprint of S.Doc. No. 8, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1941)] (judicial review is not effective to compel enforcement of laws). See
also Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 129, 136-37 (1924) (early cases);
Annot., 161 A.L.R. 1404 (1946) (failure of municipality to adopt or enforce traffic regulations,
or to properly maintain traffic signal devices).
25. 75 Ill. 2d 208,-390 N.E.2d 847 (1979).
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provision which directed the legislature to abolish personal property
taxation. Prior cases held that such directives merely expressed the
will of the people and could not be enforced by the courts. In Hynes
the court departed from this position and abolished Cook County's
corporate Personal Property Tax.
Most courts also refuse to impose a duty to enforce laws. However,
some cases hold that the existence of a statute obligates the govern-
ment to act.26 This approach has created inconsistencies in the law.
Three modern cases with similar factual situations indicate the
present confusion in this area.
In Leger v. Kelly, 27 the Connecticut Commissioner of Motor Vehi-
cles was not held liable although his deputies failed to follow a law
requiring him to refuse registration to cars not equipped with safety
glass. In Leger the plaintiff was injured in an auto accident. He
contended that his injuries were aggravated because the car in
which he was riding was not equipped with safety glass. The Con-
necticut court reasoned that a duty existed only when the actions
the officer was required to perform affected the injured individual
in a manner different in kind from the injury the general public
would suffer. Paglia v. State,28 decided by a New York Court of
Claims a few years earlier, reached the opposite result. In Paglia the
state was held liable when a purchaser relied on the registration
forms and title papers presented by the seller of a car. The seller,
who had stolen the car, had received certificates of ownership from
a government officer who failed to read a list of names and titles not
to be acted upon. The court concluded that despite the state's not
being an insurer of titles, a certain responsibility in their actions was
reasonably relied upon when officers were asked to enforce the law."
Guy v. State, 10 decided in New York sixteen years after Paglia,
26. See, e.g., Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956), modifying 220 F.2d 666 (10th
Cir. 1955)(failure to comply with notice requirements of federal regulation); City of Albany
v. Burt, 88 Ga.App. 144, 76 S.E.2d 413 (1953)(failure to enforce law requiring shut-off safety
on gas pilot lights); Bronaugh v. Murray, 294 Ky. 715, 172 S.W.2d 591 (1943)(failure to require
bus driver to obtain mandatory insurance); Cochrane v. Mayor of City of Frostburgh, 81 Md.
54, 31 A. 703 (1895)(failure to prevent cows from running in street); Burnett v. City of
Greenville, 106 S.C. 255, 91 S.E. 203 (1917)(failure to prohibit drag-racing on streets not safe
for that purpose). One unusual case, Parks v. Board of County Comm'rs, 11 Or. App. 177,
501 P.2d 85 (1972), implied that officers who failed to follow an ordinance in granting a zoning
permit had an obligation to undo their statutory violations. See generally Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d
700 (1972)(personal liability of officer for injury suffered as a result of failure to enforce law
or arrest lawbreaker).
27. 19 Conn. Supp. 167, 110 A.2d 635 (1954), aff'd, 142 Conn. 585, 116 A.2d 429 (1955).
28. 199 Misc. 625, 99 N.Y.S.2d 878 (Ct.Cl.1950).
29. Id.
30. 50 Misc. 2d 29, 269 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1966).
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suggests that there is as much inconsistency within particular juris-
dictions as exists nationally. In Guy, plaintiff was unable to recover
from the government after being injured by an automobile driven
by someone whose license had not been revoked despite prior con-
victions for six moving violations and responsibility for one other
accident. The court denied recovery on the ground that there was
no foreseeability of injury.
The final major limitation on the government's duty to act is the
"discretionary function ' 3 ' defense. The defense is unique to public
actions. Under it, courts hold that there is no duty to choose cor-
rectly when a government or public officer makes a "rational"
choice between competing alternatives.3 ,33 Even when the choice is
31. See 63 AM. JUR. 2d, Public Officers & Employees §292 (1972); James, The Federal
Tort Claims Act and the "Discretionary Function" Exception: The Sluggish Retreat of an
Ancient Immunity, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 184 (1957).
32. See generally Davis, Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 MINN. L. REV. 751, 798-
800 (1956); Peck, The Federal Tort Claims Act -A Proposed Construction of the Discretion-
ary Function Exception, 31 WASH. L. REV. 207 (1956). Peck proposes that the discretionary
function involves:
[Aicts and omissions . . . [that] were specifically directed, or risks knowingly,
deliberately, or necessarily encountered, by one authorized to do so, for the ad-
vancement of a governmental objective and pursuant to discretionary authority
given him . . .authority to make a decision that the act, omission, or risk involved
was one which it was necessary or desirable to perform or encounter in order to
achieve the objectives or purposes for which he was given authority.
Id. at 225-26 (emphasis in original).
The discretionary function exception seems to have grown out of deference to judicial choice,
and spread by analogy to acts done by public officers in general which involved some form of
rational choice. One of the earliest cases on the discretionary function defense, Stephens v.
Watson, 91 Eng.Rep. 44 (K.B. 1672), involved an action against officers for denying an ale
house license. The court said that "the want of a license can only come in question, and not
the reason and cause why it was denied." Id. at 45. See also Rex v. Young, 97 Eng.Rep. 447,
449 (K.B. 1758) ("discretion does mean, (and can mean nothing else but) exercising the best
of their judgment upon the occasion that calls for it. ... ); Gile's Case, 93 Eng.Rep. 914
(Q.B. 1731)(mandamus inappropriate because issuance of license was discretionary). This
reasoning was adopted in the United States in an action brought against a postmaster for
failure to pay money. Justice Taney suggested in Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 87
(1845), that "a public officer is not liable to an action if he falls into error in a case where
the act to be done is not merely a ministerial one, but is one in relation to which it is his
duty to exercise judgment and discretion. ... Id. at 98.
33. An early version of the discretionary/ministerial dichotomy appears in cases involving
clerical errors by public officers. Cases imposing liability on public officers for such clerical-
error ministerial nonfeasance include: Willet v. Hutchinson, 2 Root 85 (Conn. 1794)(failure
to record title transfer); Daggett v. Adams, 1 Me. 198 (1821)(failure to obtain fair market
value at sheriffs auction); Bishop v. Schneider, 46 Mo. 472 (1870)(failure to record deed);
Thomas v. Grupposo, 73 Misc. 2d 427, 341 N.Y.S.2d 819 (1973)(failure to return motorcycle
held, and then erroneously sold, at police auction); Higby Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Utica,
54 Misc. 2d 405, 282 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1967)(failure of clerk to give required notice to adjacent
property owners of zoning change makes city liable); Rising v. Dickinson, 18 N.D. 478, 121
N.W. 616 (1909)(failure to file a deed); Brougham v. City of Seattle, 194 Wash. 1, 76 P.2d
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negligently made, no liability will be imposed on the officer or gov-
ernment. The discretionary function defense is also referred to as
the discretionary/ministerial test of liability. Under this test a duty
exists when the omission is ministerial or clerical in nature but not
when it results from an exercise of discretion.
Unfortunately, the courts have been unable to differentiate pre-
cisely between discretionary and ministerial acts." This imprecision
reflects the fundamental dilemma underlying any imposition of
public liability: public liability must expand as a result of the
growth of government, but it cannot expand too much and thus
become a burdensome deterrent to public activity.
Two Supreme Court cases are illustrative of the discretion-
ary/ministerial dichotomy and the problems created by it. Dalehite
1013 (1938)(failure to sell car at police auction). Contra Sidbury v. Gill, 102 F. Supp. 483
(E.D.N.C. 1952)(failure to remove fraudulently issued tax liens from taxpayer's property);
Stiglitz v. Detroit, 239 Mich. 26, 214 N.W. 150 (1927)(failure to execute tax deeds to plaintiff
as required by laws); Yelton v. Becker, 248 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. App. 1952)(refusal to honor
reclamation bond); Lyman v. Edgerton, 29 Vt. 305 (1857)(failure to file index card); Billings
v. State, 27 Wash. 288, 67 P. 583 (1902)(failure to deliver patent on sale of tide lands).
Several cases have imposed liability for clerical or other errors in situations involving court
proceedings: Jeffers v. Taylor, 178 Ky. 392, 198 S.W. 1160 (1917) (clerk of court liable for
deputy's failure to give copy of pleadings to plaintiff); Gray v. Hakenjos, 366 Mich. 588, 115
N.W.2d 411 (1962)(possibly subject to removal for failure to serve process); Brown v. Lester,
21 Miss. 392 (1850)(clerk liable for failing to put case on docket); Clark v. Miller, 54 N.Y.
528 (1874)(superintendent liable for failing to present claim where delay resulted in loss of
claim); Tompkins v. Sand, 8 Wend. 462 (N.Y. 1832)(justice of peace liable after failing to
accept appeal bond; judicial immunity does not apply to purely ministerial duties). Other
cases have imposed liability for clerical errors when officers have failed to pay money to
private parties: Burns v. Moragne, 128 Ala. 493, 29 So. 460 (1901); People v. Hughey, 382 Ill.
136, 47 N.E.2d 77 (1943); Cassady v. Trustees of Schools, 105 Ill. 560 (1883); Strickfadden v.
Zipprick, 49 111. 286 (1868); People ex rel. Pope County v. Shelter, 318 Ill. App. 279, 47 N.E.2d
732 (1943); Hupe v. Sommer, 88 Kan. 561, 129 P. 136 (1913); Cottongim v. Stewart, 283 Ky.
615, 142 S.W.2d 171 (1940); Allen v. Commonwealth, 83 Va. 94, 1 S.E. 607 (1886). Failure to
properly mark official forms has generated liability in several cases: First Nat'l Bank of Key
West v. Filer, 107 Fla. 526, 145 So.*204 (1933)(failing to put official seal on securities); Howley
v. Scott, 123 Minn. 159, 143 N.W. 257 (1913)(failing to stamp list and receipt "sold for
taxes"); State ex rel. Smith v. Johnson, 12 Ohio App. 2d 87, 231 N.E.2d 81 (1967)(failing to
have plaintiff candidate sign all duplicate copies of petition). Even when a particular task
becomes quite difficult as, for example, audits in a bank, the courts have often imposed
liability for clerical-type errors. Tcherepnin v. Franz, 393 F. Supp. 1197 (N.D. Ill. 1975)(direc-
tor of state department of banking potentially liable for failing to act when he knew savings
and loan was in serious difficulty); State ex rel. Allen v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 27
Idaho 752, 152 P. 189 (i15)(surety liable after examiner failed to look at books). But see
Tucker v. Edwards, 214 La. 560, 38 So.2d 241 (1949)(board members not liable when they
failed to prosecute to conclusion a suit on a bond held by a bank which failed); Sherlock v.
State, 198 App. Div. 494, 191 N.Y.S. 412 (1921)(state held not liable for bank inspector's
failure).
34. F. BOHLEN & F. HARPER, TORTS, § 298, at 670 (combined ed. 1933); Davis,
Administrative Officers' Tort Liability, 55 MICH. L. REv. 201, 206 (1956).
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v. United States,35 involved a borderline distinction between non-
feasance and misfeasance. The United States, preparing to ship
fertilizer to recently defeated Japan and Germany, had chosen to
use a fast-acting, high-nitrogen fertilizer. The fertilizer caught fire
and exploded, killing hundreds of people and causing more than two
hundred million dollars in property damage. The Court found that
"the decisions held culpable were all responsibly made at a planning
rather than operational level and involved considerations more or
less important to the practicability of the Government's . . .pro-
gram." 6 Thus, the Court fashioned a test for determining whether
the government had been performing a discretionary function. If a
decision to act or not to act was made rationally at a planning level
of government it was "discretionary" and the government was not
liable.
Indian Towing v. United States,7 decided only four years after
Dalehite, involved a shipwreck caused by the Coast Guard's failure
to keep a lighthouse beacon burning. Sixty thousand dollars in dam-
ages were claimed. The Court distinguished Dalehite in one sent-
ence, concluding that the Indian Towing omission occurred at the
operational rather than planning level, and that the United States
should pay damages. The Court reasoned that failure to check a
battery did not involve any elements of administrative choice. By
contrast, in Dalehite the government decision-makers had con-
ciously chosen to use high-nitrogen fertilizer and not to take certain
precautions after deciding that the risk of fire was outweighed by
the urgency of providing rapidly acting fertilizer.3 1
This distinction blurs in the leading state case, Johnson v. State. 40
35. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
36. Id. at 42. The discretionary/ministerial dichotomy is codified in one form in the
Federal Tort Claims Act 28 U.S.C. §2680(a) (1976).
37. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
38. Id. at 64. The dissent argued forcefully that there was no way to distinguish the
omissions actually alleged in Dalehite (failure to inspect the fertilizer bags) from the omis-
sions in Indian Towing. Id. at 73-76 (Reed, J., dissenting).
39. The great disparity in damages sought in the two cases (well over two hundred million
dollars in Dalehite, compared with sixty thousand dollars claimed in Indian Towing) has
provided a cynical rationale for reconciling the cases.
40. 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968). 7 Negl. Comp. Cases Annot.
417-74 (4th Cir. 1971), collects numerous cases and suggests that Johnson is somewhat
unique. Cf. Wasserstein v. State, 32 App. Div. 2d 119, 300 N.Y.S. 2d 263 (1969), a/I'd, 27
N.Y. 2d 627, 313 N.Y.S.2d 759, 261 N.E.2d 665 (1970)(state not liable when parole officer
failed to take boy into custody before he committed crime). Two years after the Wasserstein
case, however, Nevada abolished sovereign immunity and in a factual situation similar to
that in Johnson and Wasserstein. In State v. Silva, 86 Nev. 911, 478 P.2d 591 (1970), a cause
of action was found to exist when an employee's wife was raped by an inmate of an honor
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In Johnson, California child placement authorities failed to tell fos-
ter parents that a youth placed in their care had homicidal tenden-
cies. After the youth had severely beaten one of the parents, suit was
filed charging that failure to notify the foster parents was a purely
ministerial omission and consequently California should be held
liable. The California Supreme Court agreed. Although the State
argued that a conscious decision not to tell the foster parents had
been made after weighing the risk of violence against the need to
place a difficult child, the court determined that a discretionary
decision could not negate the existence of a duty. The court appar-
ently felt that as the potential harm likely to arise from a wrong
decision increases the effectiveness of the discretionary function as
a method for eliminating the duty to decide correctly decreases.4'
The discretionary/ministerial test is not workable. The two types
of activities cannot truely be distinguished. But that is not the end
of the problem. Even if the distinction could be defined and then
implemented, the result might be undesirable. The exercise of dis-
cretion is not the exercise of law. One injured by a discretionary act
or omission might have received a completely different fate had the
decision been made by a different officer."2 This inconsistency of
administrative result is no less troubling than the judicial inconsis-
tency in determining when discretion is an appropriate legal de-
fense .3
From this discussion it should become clear that the question of
the existence of duty itself cannot adequately serve as the basis for
camp. The state argued unsuccessfully that maintenance of the camp and the lessened
security were discretionary actions. The case was remanded for a determination on the issue
of negligence.
41. In an oft-cited case, Learned Hand advocated a distinctly different proposition: abso-
lute immunity for public officers to prevent the fear of repeated litigation against them. This
immunity would protect them even though they acted maliciously while carrying out discre-
tionary activities. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949). See, e.g., Pound,
Individualization of Justice, 7 FORDHAM L. REV. 153 (1938). Speaking of unfettered adminis-
trative discretion, Pound said:
Such things are not due merely to the personality of individual administrative
officials. They inhere in the system itself which calls for speedy action and treating
of each instance as unique, and seems to put the attainment of some object in a
particular situation so much in the foreground as to eliminate the general security
from consideration.
Id. at 160.
See also K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 215 (1969); B. SCHWARTZ, THE PROFESSOR AND THE
COMMISSIONS 271 (1959). Reich, The New Property, supra note 2 at 733-87 (1964).
42. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 606-13 (1976)(Schwartz also expresses the fear
that the discretionary function defense may be abused by public officers and become a
method of justifying or defending arbitrary administrative decisions).
43. See generally PROSSER, supra note 4, §131.
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determining public liability. Many courts simply assume a duty
exists and go on to deal with other questions.
WHO OWES THE DUTY
In actions for public nonfeasance, the duty may be owed by either
the officer or the government. The determination of who owes the
duty is crucial becausesome defenses may be available to one type
of public defendant and not to another."
Although early victims of public nonfeasance could not recover
from the government itself, recovery was possible in a tort action
against the officer who failed to act.45 Two developments prompted
a change in this scheme. First, the private law of torts progressed,
subjecting defendants to increased liability. Second, the expanding
size and scope of governmental activity increased the likelihood that
a public officer would commit a tort. Since these parallel develop-
ments subjected officers to excessive liability, the courts gradually
developed the idea of officer immunity. That defense protected the
government's employees from ruinous suits.
However, this new immunity engendered another problem: if the
officer was protected and the government retained its traditional
immunity, the plaintiff would be unable to recover from any party.
To avoid this problem, the courts gradually reduced the immunity
of the government. Thus, the obligation to act for the benefit of
another shifted from the officer to the government."
The legislative answer to the question of whether the officer of the
government should owe the duty is similar to that arrived at by the
courts. Liability has been gradually transferred from the officer to
the government by one of two forms of legislative codification. One
type provides immunity for officers and local governmental units. 7
44. See notes 89-101 infra and accompanying text.
45. See generally 1 T. BEVEN, NEGLIGENCE IN LAW 349 (2d ed. 1895); 2 F. GOODNOW,
COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 163-69 (1893); 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 102-03 (1924); B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 555-57 (1976); Comment,
Developments in the Law, Remedies Against the United States and its Officials, 70 HARV. L.
REV. 827, 830 (1957).
46. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §231 at 801-07 (1951); R. PARKER, ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE LAW 288-91 (1952); see also B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 555-57 (1976); Ber-
mann, Integrating Governmental & Officer Tort Liability, 77 COLUM. L. R. 1175 (1977);
Comment, Developments in the Law Remedies Against the United States and its Officials,
supra note 45 at 830-31.
47. The Illinois Local Government and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act
exemplifies the immunity type of statute. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §§1-101 to 10-101 (1977).
The Act establishes broad immunity for officers and serves as a virtual index of cases that
imposed personal liability on officers at common law. Public officers in Illinois now have
immunity for almost every act they could commit as public employees except willful and
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These laws do not alter the common law liability or immunity of the
state government.4" The second type of codification broadly ac-
knowledges that the government itself owes the duty and will accept
certain tort responsibility49 (generally with numerous exceptions).
Both types of statutes accomplish the purpose of shifting the duty
from the officer, often ill-equipped to pay damage judgments, to the
governmental unit.
Today this process is almost complete. If a duty is owed at all,
the courts generally conclude that it is owed by the government.
50
Ironically, situations in which the modern law is most likely to hold
that the government owes the duty, those involving torts committed
by law enforcement officers, concern the same type of officers who
were most frequently involved in the earliest period of the transi-
tion, namely, the common law sheriffs who served as the focal point
in the transition between officer and government liability.
The common law sheriff was the original government bureaucrat.
Sheriffs, however, were not public officers in the same sense as that
term is understood today. Although the sheriff received his office
and title from the king, he was not a salaried employee. Rather, he
made his living by collecting a percentage of the ,,alue of the goods
that he levied upon and by extracting a fee from the people whom
he imprisoned for failure to pay debts.5 The sheriff, a quasi-public
wanton negligence in the enforcement or execution of a law. Id. at §2-207. Local governmental
entities enjoy similar comprehensive immunity. It must be stressed, however, that immunity
granted by the Illinois Local Government and Governmental Employee Immunity Act does
not apply to higher levels of government such as the county or state. Those units remain liable
in basically the same manner as at common law.
48. See notes 89-101 infra and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§1346(b), 2671-80 (1976). The act
establishes the federal government's broad assumption of the obligation for the benefit of
another. Id. at § 1346(b). It states that the government itself owes the duty and therefore must
accept liability for all of the negligent acts or omissions of its employees, but for certain
exceptions. The principal exception involves acts committed or omitted while the officer or
government is exercising a discretionary function. Id. at §2680(a). As discussed earlier in
relation to the common law, no government duty exists when the officer is making a rational
choice between two competing alternatives. See notes 31-43 supra and accompanying text. It
is unclear whether, or to what extent, a federal officer has statutory immunity. The officer,
of course, retains his common law defenses of reasonableness and good faith. See McCord,
Fault Without Liability: Immunity of Federal Employees, 1966 U. ILL. L. F. 849.
50. For an historical perspective leading to present law, compare United States v. Hull,
195 F.2d 64 (1st Cir. 1952)(government liable for subordinate officer's failure to secure post
office window) with Rowning v. Goodchild, 96 Eng. Rep. 536 (C.P. 1773)(local postmaster but
not policy-making postmaster general, liable for deputy postman's nonfeasance). See gener-
ally F. BURDICK, THE LAW OF TORTS 183-84 (2d ed. 1908)(discussion of movement of the
modern courts toward Holt's position that both subordinates and their superiors should be
liable for subordinates' nonfeasance); see also Schirrot & Drew, The Vicarious Liability of
Public Officials Under the Civil Right Act, 8 AKRON L. REv. 69 (1974).
51. See generally 47 AM.JuR. Sheriffs, Police and Constables, §§2, 47, 82, 96 (1943).
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employee, realized a direct relationship between the effectiveness of
the work that he or his deputies did and the amount of money that
he made. 52 Because sheriffs were not direct employees of the king,
and because some method of control was needed to curb the sheriffs'
excesses, the early courts did not protect the sheriff with the king's
immunity from liability. He was considered a private person for the
purpose of the suit.
Although Bracton had noted the potential liability of the sheriff
for nonfeasance as early as the thirteenth century,5 3 the first lengthy
discussion of a sheriff's failure to act occurred in Ashby v. White in
1707.11 In an action for failing to let a freeman vote, Lord Holt
argued that recovery must be allowed because "[w]here a man has
but one remedy to come at his right, if he loses that he loses his
right.15 Holt asserted that if "public officers . . . infringe men's
rights, they ought to pay greater damages than other men, to deter
and hinder other officers from like officers. '56
Though the central idea of this early case has been followed in a
substantial number of cases imposing liability on the sheriff for a
failure to act, 57 in 1875 the Supreme Court severely limited the
personal liability of the sheriff in Dow v. Humbert. 58 Discussing the
old cases, the Court reasoned that when a direct relationship existed
between an officer's acts and his remuneration, logic dictated the
imposition of severe personal penalties for nonfeasance. On the
other hand, the American sheriff was a salaried government em-
52. Id. at §§ 96-111.
53. 2 BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 216-17, 348 (cc. 1260) (Thorne ed.
1968).
54. 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B. 1707)(three-fold test for recovery set out: plaintiff must show
1) individual right or privilege, 2) hindered by an officer even though the officer was exercising
discretion, 3) done with malice).
55. Id. at 136.
56. Id. at 137. But cf. M'Kinnon v. Penson, 156 Eng. Rep. 260, 262 (Ex.Ch. 1854)(no
liability for failure to repair a highway):
[Ulpon general principles of our law, the inhabitants of a county ought to have
been suable by an individual for compensation, where he has sustained a personal
and peculiar injury, from a neglect by them of their duty as such; but they were
held not to be suable on grounds of convenience and justice; because it wasimpossi-
ble to bring them all into Court, because they were a fluctuating body, and individ-
uals might be made responsible for omission of which, not they, but others, had
been guilty; because, if the damages were levied on one or two there would be no
practical and effective way of compensating them by contribution from the rest;
because, at common law, they had no common property out of which the damages
could be answered.
57. Bondurant v. Lane, 9 Port. 484 (Ala. 1839); Palmer v. Gallup, 16 Conn. 555 (1844);
Laflin v. Willard, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 64 (1834); Rich v. Bell, 16 Mass. 294 (1820); Hamilton
v. Ward, 4 Tex. 356 (1849).
58. 91 U.S. 294 (1875).
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ployee. His personal liability should be limited accordingly."
The common law sheriffs modern successors, law enforcement
authorities, play a similar transitional role in a recent realignment
of the answer to the question of who owes the duty. 0 For example,
the Federal Tort Claims Act,"1 one of the broadest codifications of
the expanding liability of the government, generally accepts the
view that the government itself owes the duty to the plaintiff for a
broad range of tortious acts and omissions committed by federal
officers.2 Traditionally, however, Congress excluded intentional
torts by governmental officers because it had concluded that the
legal obligation not to do something intentionally against another
person was a duty owed to that person by the individual officer and
not by the government. 3 In 1974, however, the law was changed and
the federal government acknowledged that it owes the duty of pre-
venting certain intentional torts, particularly torts of violence or
abuse of authority committed by law enforcement officers. 4 By
gradually moving toward the view that the government, not the
officer, generally owes the duty, the law has shifted responsibility
for public nonfeasance from individuals who rarely could pay dam-
age judgments to massive institutions far more capable of absorbing
or spreading the cost of compensating injury. Increased liability in
suits against the state also assures that the highest levels of govern-
ment receive notice when the bureaucracy is not functioning
smoothly. This notification encourages governmental superiors to
closely watch subordinates likely to frustrate governmental policies.
Lord Holt suggested two hundred and seventy-five years ago in
Lane v. Cotton"5 that the imposition of personal liability on superior
officers for the negligent omissions of their subordinates would deter
public wrongdoing by those subordinates. Close supervision of sub-
ordinates should promote regularity in government. The superior
59. Only two cases subsequent to Dow have been found that retain the early common
law's imposition of personal liability on the sheriff: Sidelinger v. Freeman, 86 Ill. App. 514
(1899) (dictum)(sheriff may be liable for delaying until after expiration date on writ); Gilbert
v. Gallup, 76 111. App. 526 (1898) (sheriff liable for damages after failing to levy on property).
60. See generally Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39
MINN. L. REV. 493 (1955); Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities For Constitutional
Violations, 89 HARV. L. REV. 922 (1976).
61. 28 U.S.C. §§1346(b), 2671-80 (1976).
62. Id. §1346(b).
63. See also W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY §89, at 155-60 (1964) (a private
master will be liable for a servant's intentional torts only if they arise out of the type of work
performed).
64. 28 U.S.C. §2680(b) (1976).
65. 91 Eng. Rep. 1332 (K.B. 1701).
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officer or the government should owe the duty for the subordinate's
incompetence.
Lord Holt's prescience pinpoints the problem. As the government
expands and accepts greater responsibility for correcting perceived
social ills, a discontinuity often develops between the expressed
policy of the government and the personal feelings of the govern-
ment's employees. Officers may actively disapprove of the govern-
ment policy and intentionally disrupt its implementation, or they
may unconsciously fail to cooperate for a variety of non-political
reasons in the practical aspects of governmental operation."6 The
courts are forced to deal with this problem chiefly in actions brought
66. For discussions of the problem of informal obstruction in the administrative process,
see generally, Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1935); A. DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 261 (1967); R.
POUND, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 36-37,127(1942); B. SCHWARTZ, THE PROFESSOR & THE
COMMISSIONERS 271 (1959); McLachlan, Democratizing the Administrative Process: Toward
Increased Responsiveness, 13 ARIZ. L. REV. 835, 845-47 (1971):
In sum, the competence of bureaucracies to accurately identify the relevant inter-
ests of the contemporary social and physical environment is subject to the frailties
of human nature and individual prejudice. Elitism of expertise, communication
loss, mutuality of interest, and racial and class bigotry, to name a few, are negative
influences which frustrate rational decision-making. When these influences are
allowed to continue unchecked, the best-intentioned administrator will rarely ob-
tain a result consistent with the public interest.
Id. at 846-47.
For a discussion of informal resistance from an opposite point of view, see Comment,
Performance Ratings-Who Needs Them???, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 509 (1970) (difficulty of condi-
tions for employees and superiors in government agencies). See also 2 Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States, Official Recommendations, No. 71-9 at 53 (July 1970) (suggests
controlling this problem by implementing techniques that correspond to private business
management). See generally, for discussions of the difficult problems created by subordinate
government employees, K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §7.12-1 at 342 (Supp. 1970)
(discussing lawlessness of welfare employees and citing study indicating that almost one-third
of decisions to withhold or terminate aid were unlawful or at least questionable); Denvir,
Controlling Welfare Bureaucracy: A Dynamic Approach, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 457 (1975)
(discussing management reform as only possible method of alleviating informal resistance);
Marshaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on
the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare
Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772, 790 (1974) (court-imposed reforms are ineffective; subordi-
nate officers create methods of avoiding court rules); Washington, Welfare Grievance Machi-
nery in New York City, 7 Hous. L. REV. 620 (1970).
Despite the difficulty of recovering damage for informal nonfeasance, injunctive relief has
often been granted to force bureaucratic compliance with the policy set by the high-level
government officers. Failure of government officers to follow agency rules has been a frequent
source of litigation. Compare American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service, 397 U.S.
532 (1970) (need not comply with rule if it is meant only to assure orderly transaction of
government business) with Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959) (agency must comply with
its own rules if they provide substantive protection). See also Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of
Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969) (agency forced to comply with rules contained in informational
pamphlet); King v. Martin, 21 Cal. App. 3d 791, 98 Cal.Rptr. 711 (1971) (welfare authorities
compelled to comply with agency regulation requiring fair hearing decisions to be rendered
within 60 days).
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against the government for injunctive relief. Since it would be im-
practical for courts to allow suits against the myriad individual
bureaucrats informally contributing to nonfeasance, judicial inter-
vention has been increasingly aimed at the bureaucracy itself. With
growing frequency the courts find that the government itself owes a
duty, namely, the duty to work efficiently. If subordinate officers
frustrate the implementation of that duty, the government itself
must be held responsible. Injunctive relief against the government
allows the courts to force the highest levels of bureaucracies to con-
trol the lowest level bureaucrats. While the means may have
changed since the early common law when an action would have
been appropriate only against the individual officer, the end result
is the same: the government works more efficiently. 7
67. An agency's claimed lack of funds has not deterred courts from forcing the agency to
act. E.g., Poirrier v. St. James Parish Police Jury, 372 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd,
531 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1976)(administrators failed to put vacant hospital into operation);
Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (court threatened sale of state property
to obtain money for improving conditions). A related defense, lack of staff, has been equally
ineffective. E.g., Like v. Carter, 448 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1045
(1972) (lack of staff no excuse for failing to process welfare applications); Quarles v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Va. 1967) (EEOC forced to comply with sixty day time
limit).
The lack of staff and funds in governmental offices is related to an additional problem. If
officers are subject to personal liability for their failure to act or for their positive acts, it may
be difficult for the government to attract talented people. There is fear that the government
would cease to act at all if it had constantly to defend its acts. Notwithstanding the increasing
attractiveness of civil service positions, this may be a genuine concern. This problem was
raised as early as the 18th century. MacBeath v. Haldimand, 99 Eng. Rep. 1036 (K.B. 1786)
(action for officer's failure to pay for corn and grease); Bassett v. Godschall, 95 Eng. Rep.
967 (K.B. 1770) (failure to issue ale-house license). For modern echoes of these early fears,
see R. LORCH, DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 199 (1969); B. WYMAN, THE
PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW GOVERNING THE RELATIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS §10 at
35-36 (1903); Block, Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity
Doctrine, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1060 (1946); Clark, Discretionary Function and Official Immunity:
Judicial Forays into Sanctuaries from Tort Liability, 16 A.F.L. REV. 33, 46 (1974). Contra,
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 110 (2d ed. 1975) (suggesting that govern-
ment would run more efficiently if states were held liable in damages); 2 F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1617 (1956) (increasing suits against government should be allowed
to stimulate unresponsive public bureaucracies); Davis, Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 AD.
L. REV. 383, 394-402 (1970) (extensive discussion of fallacy in thinking that government would
stop if courts interfered); Nelson & Avnaim, Claims Against a California Governmental
Entity or Employee, 6 Sw. L. REv. 550 (1974) (use of strict interpretation of time limits and
statutory claims procedures to limit the increasing liability of governments as immunity
defense is abandoned).
Informal bureaucratic resistance is often merely a reflection of the differing views held by
politically responsible policy-making individuals and subordinate officers charged with carry-
ing out the policy. See, e.g., Ramos v. County of Madera, 4 Cal. 3d 685, 494 P.2d 93, 94
Cal.Rptr. 421 (1971), in which county welfare authorities had threatened to terminate from
assistance any child over ten years old who did not work in the fields at harvest time, when
the schools were closed for that purpose. The court described this as a shocking example of
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Two cases from the Supreme Court are illustrative. In the early
case of Boyden v. Burke,"5 the Court dealt with an officer who had
refused to give patent reports to an applicant because of the appli-
cant's rudeness and bad language. The officer's informal precondi-
tion of good manners, though salutary in theory, was unacceptable
because "[i]ll manners or bad temper do not work a forfeiture of
men's civil rights."69 Boyden plainly represents the early position
that the officer himself owed the duty, and that an action would be
against him alone for his informal acts or omissions. With little
difficulty the Court found that the officer personally owed the duty
to deliver the report.
In 1974, the Supreme Court looked again at informal bureaucratic
resistance. In Edelman v. Jordan,7" Justice Rehnquist allowed in-
junctive relief against the Illinois Department of Public Aid and
forced the Illinois welfare authorities to eliminate lengthy delays
between application for and approval of disability benefits. Al-
though the Court denied retroactive damages to the plaintiffs for the
department's prior failures to act promptly,7 Edelman represents a
informal and illegal governmental action and made the city and employees personally liable
for damages for failing to follow the law. See generally R. LORCH, DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 203-04 (1969); Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerg-
ing Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1252-57 (1965) (compares formality of agency procedures
when lawyers accompany citizens with agency informality when citizens face government
alone); Comment, Scaling the Welfare Bureaucracy: Expanding Concepts of Governmental
Employee Liability, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 624, 642-44 (1973) (extensive discussion of remedies
possible against bureaucrats including possible malpractice action).
68. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 575 (1852).
69. Id. at 583.
70. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
71. Most of the commentary on Edelman has been directed toward this aspect of the case.
See, e.g., Davidson, Welfare Cases and the "New Majority": Constitutional Theory and
Practice, 10 HARV. C. R. - C. L. L. J. 513 (1975); Note, Edelman v. Jordan: A New Stage in
Eleventh Amendment Evolution, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 496 (1975). But see Rodriguez v.
Swank, 496 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974). In Rodriguez, the court
imposed a $100 fine, payable to an applicant for assistance, if the welfare department failed
to process applications within the prescribed time period. The Rodriguez court supported
imposition of a fine for future misdeeds by the state by quoting from Edelman in a most
elipitical fashion. See 496 F.2d 1110, 1112. For the Supreme Court's actual statement see 415
U.S. 651, 668 (1974).
Additionally, the court reasoned that if the generally available remedy of injunctive relief
proves ineffective as a means to elicit efficiency in government, the remedy of damages as a
monetary stimulus may be needed. Still, because courts are more willing to require future
acts from the government than to make it pay for past errors, damages generally will not be
awarded if injunctive relief could have been applied effectively at an earlier stage. Industrial
Comm'n v. Superior Court, 5 Ariz. App. 100, 423 P.2d 375 (1967) (officers not liable for
damages in failing to hold meeting because relief could be sought by mandamus); Burns v.
City Council, 31 Cal. App. 3d 999, 107 Cal.Rptr. 787 (1973) (no liability in damages after
board refused to issue license because mandamus was available as means to compel action).
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large step in the development of public liability for nonfeasance.
The Court accepted the fact that the government owed the duty to
act and could be liable for nonfeasance.
The modern approach of finding that the duty is owed by the
government evinces a concern over the expansive size of modem
government. Large public institutions may be detrimental to the
public interest in at least two important respects. First, bureau-
cratic stagnation impedes efficient government. Thus larger govern-
ment may have difficulty serving its constituents. Second, public
institutions now often appear to have at least one function other
than the implementation of the government's expressed goals. This
informal function is self-preservation. Further expansion, or at least
maintenance of the status quo, has come to be a self-imposed pur-
pose of bureaucratic existence. When the duty is imposed directly
A group of cases involving voting is representative of the development of the law of public
nonfeasance and the general preference for injunctive relief when possible. But as the com-
mon law of public liability expanded, damages often were required from officers where injunc-
tive relief was no longer possible. The earliest case suggesting this is Sterling v. Turner, 86
Eng.Rep. 139 (K.B. 1672), in which the mayor was held liable in money damages for failing
to take a ballot vote after the voice vote for bridgemaster was inconclusive. Because injunctive
relief could not compel a change in the election results, damages were allowed. See also School
Directors v. Miller, 54 Il. 338 (1870) (directors personally liable on official promissory notes
after failing to call mandatory election to approve issuance); Stradford v. Reinecke, 6 Ill.
App. 2d 537, 128 N.E.2d 588 (1955)(dicta) (officer may be subject to damages for failing to
keep ballots until after determination of recount); Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350 (1814)
(election judge liable for damages for refusing to allow plaintiff to vote); Larson v. Marsh,
144 Neb. 644, 14 N.W.2d 189 (1944) (officer liable for nominal damages for failing to put
plaintiffs name on ballot); Schwartz v. Heffernan, 304 N.Y. 474, 109 N.E.2d 68 (1952) (board
members potentially liable in individual capacity for failure to put name on ballot); Jeffries
v. Ankeny, 11 Ohio 372 (1842) (offspring of white man and half-breed Indian allowed cause
of action for damages when town trustees refused to let him vote). Contra, Gibson v. Winter-
set Community School Dist., 358 Iowa 440, 138 N.W.2d 112 (1966)(mandamus allowed but
not damages, to force board to call bond issue election; evasion of positive duty is equivalent
to refusal to perform); Kopfler v. Edwards, 318 So. 2d 653 (La. App. 1975) (mandamus only
remedy available when board failed to call election for judge). Generally, for a plaintiff to
succeed in obtaining injunctive relief or mandamus, the action sought to be compelled or the
inaction sought to be remedied cannot be discretionary in nature. However, the exercise itself
of discretion has been compelled. Huidekoper v. Hadley, 177 F. 1 (8th Cir. 1910) (mandamus
allowed to force assessor to exercise his discretion but no remedy once officer had acted);
Illinois State Board of Dental Examiners v. People ex rel Cooper, 123 Ill. 227, 13 N.E. 201
(1887) (mandamus allowed to force board to make discret;-nary decision on reputability of
school); Grove v. Board of Supervisors, 246 Il1. App. 241 (1927) (mandamus allowed to compel
granting of license to run dance hall); Tyrell v. Burke, 110 N.J.L. 225, 164 A. 586 (1933)
(dicta) (mandamus could be used to compel board to make decision whether to license
qualified embalmer); State ex rel. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Brown, 165 Ohio St. 521,
138 N.E.2d 248 (1956) (writ of procedendo allowed to force board to hear workmen's compen-
sation claim); see generally 2 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 572-85 (1965); 2 J. HIGH,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS §§ 1310-11 at 861-63 (2d ed. 1890); Sullivan, Judicial
Review in Illinois, 1949 U. ILL. L.F. 304, 306 (use of mandamus to compel performance by
officer who fails to act in state that has not consented to public suit).
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on the government itself, a mechanism exists for checking these
negative aspects of big government.
To WHOM Is THE DUTY OWED
Where courts determine that the government or its officer owes a
duty to act, they may find that obligation owed to the individual
injured by the government's nonfeasance or to the public. If the
duty flows to the public the injured plaintiff may not recover. How-
ever, if the duty is owed to the individual himself because he in-
curred a specific and unique injury, the courts have held that the
government or the officer will be liable. The requirement of a spe-
cific and unique injury, an injury different in kind from that suf-
fered by the public, has been imposed on the plaintiff in order to
prevent numerous individuals from suing the government for the
same nonfeasance.72
This specific injury/public duty test has proven to be very diffi-
cult to implement. Arbitrary decisions have proceeded from impre-
cise attempts to separate one factual situation from another when,
in reality, no difference existed.7 3 Because of this shortcoming, use
72. In William's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 163 (K.B. 1592) involving a vicar's failure to hold
Sunday services, the rationale was clear:
But when the chapel is not a private to him and his family, but public and common
to all his tenants of the same manor, which may be many and of great number;
there no action on the case lies for the lord; for then every of his tenants might also
have his action on the case as well as the lord himself, and so infinite actions for
one default ....
Id. at 164 (emphasis added). (At that time, a vicar in the Church of England was a quasi-
public officer).
Almost three-hundred fifty years later, Judge Cardozo, speaking for the New York Court
of Appeals, articulated the test and its rationale:
[Tihe benefit . . . must be one that is not merely incidental and secondary ...
It must be primary and immediate in such a sense and to such a degree as to
bespeak the assumption of a duty to make reparation directly to the individual
members of the public if the benefit is lost. The field of obligation would be ex-
panded beyond reasonable limits if less than this were to be demanded as a condi-
tion of liability.
H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 164, 159 N.E. 896, 897 (1928);
accord, Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704 (1945) (city not liable for failing
to provide adequate water pressure and for failing to create fire department). Contra, Veach
v. City of Phoenix, 102 Ariz. 195, 427 P.2d 335 (1967).
73. Compare City of Providence v. Clapp, 58 U.S. 160 (1854) (city liable for failing to
remove snow) and Schoden v. Schaefer, 184 Ill. App. 456 (1913) (officer liable for failing to
use drainage bonds properly) and Serpas v. Margiotta, 59 So. 2d 492 (La. App. 1952) (officer
liable for failing to catch dog) and Upchurch v. Clinton County, 330 S.W.2d 428 (Ky. 1959)
(officer liable when he failed to catch vicious animals) and Mayor of Lyme v. Henley, 6 Eng.
Rep. 1180 (1934) [also reported at 130 Eng. Rep. 995 (C.P. 1828)] (liable for failing to erect
sea wall) with Kimble v. United States, 345 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (no liability for failure
to locate widow potentially eligible for pension) and Rough v. Quinn, 20 Cal. 2d 488, 127 P.2d
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of specific and unique injury test language gradually died out over
the years. However, it may have been resurrected by the Burger
Court under the Court's test of "standing" to sue in public actions.
The recent decisions which require a direct and almost specifically
tangible connection between the plaintiff and the injury attempt to
limit public liability by using a variation of the specific injury test."
For example, in Warth v. Seldin,75 Justice Powell wrote: "the
Court has held that when the asserted harm is a 'generalized griev-
ance' shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class
of citizens that harm alone normally does not warrant exercise ofjurisdiction ."17
Similar reasoning was employed in Rizzo v. Goode.7 7 In Rizzo, the
plaintiff alleged that the Philadelphia Police Commissioner had
failed to act to prevent civil rights violations by subordinates. The
Court said that the alleged "failure to act" was insufficient to estab-
lish a connection between the plaintiffs and a specific injury; liabil-
ity could not be based on such "amorphous propositions.""' Al-
though these cases are generally understood to involve the issue of
accessibility to federal court, they can also be studied as a reinstitu-
tion of attempts to limit public liability by requiring a specific and
unique injury in suits for public nonfeasance.79
Many courts have attempted to control the extent of public liabil-
ity by creating a new test for identifying the victim. Under this test,
courts focus on the type of activity engaged in by the government
when its act or omission injured the plaintiff.
The government or the public officer is found to owe a duty di-
1 (1942) (no liability for failing to conduct tax sale) and East River Gas-Light Co. v. Donnelly,
93 N.Y. 557 (1883) (no liability for failing to accept low bids) and Butler v. Kent, 19 Johns
(N.Y.) 223 (1821) (no liability for failing to conduct lottery) and Pain v. Patrick 87 Eng. Rep.
191 (K.B. 1691) (no liability for failing to give residents customary free passage over river).
74. See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1544 (9th
ed. 1975).
75. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
76. Id. at 499.
77. 423 U.S. 362 (1976). This action was brought under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. §1983 (1970).
78. Id. at 375-76.
79. Citizen-suit statutes provide a different answer to the question of whether the govern-
ment owes the duty to the individual or to the public. These statutes suggest that any person
may bring suit as a private attorney general; standing to sue, that is, a specific and unique
injury, is provided by the statute itself. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.
§2073 (Supp. V. 1975); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §1365(a)(2) (Supp.
V. 1975); Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries (Ocean Dumping) Act, 33 U.S.C.
§1415(g) (Supp. V. 1975); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §1857(h-2) (1970); Noise Control Act, 42
U.S.C. §4911 (Supp. V. 1975). See generally Jaffee, Standing to Secure Judicial Review:
Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265 (1961).
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rectly to the injured party when the court determines that the act
or omission occurred while the government was engaged in a pro-
prietary or private function. A proprietary function is generally con-
sidered to be an activity which could be carried out by a private
party but which has been undertaken by the government 0 Thus,
when the government acts in a private manner it is liable as if it
were a private party. Conversely, when the government acts in a
purely public manner and conducts activities which only a govern-
ment could do, the duty is held to be owed to the public and not to
the private individual. Redress for public nonfeasance of a govern-
mental nature is accomplished by way of infrequent public prosecu-
tion for criminal acts."'
The proprietary/governmental distinction and its relation to the
question of to whom the duty is owed was set as early as 1466 in a
reference from the Yearbooks:
[I]f there be a common way, and it is not repaired, so that I am
damaged by the miring of my horse, I shall not have any action
for that against those who ought to repair the way, but it is a
popular action, in which case no individual shall have an action
on the case, but it is an action by way of presentment."'
The modern trend has clearly been to abolish the proprie-
tary/governmental distinction. In the leading state case, Hargrove
v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 13 the plaintiffs recovered after a prisoner
had suffocated in a jail fire. The public officers had negligently
failed to watch the jail and were unaware of the fire until it was too
late to rescue the victim. The government was liable despite the
obviously governmental activity involved in operating a jail.
Hargrove exemplifies the courts' increasing unwillingness to dis-
tinguish governmental activities from proprietary ones. Realizing
the inconsistency in decisions implementing the proprietary/
governmental distinction," the Hargrove court overruled numerous
80. 57 Am. Jur.2d, Municipal, School, and State Tort Liability, §27 (1971); Note, Torts -
Sovereign Immunity - The Government's Liability for Tortious Conduct Arising from Proprie-
tary Functions, 20 DE PAUL L. REV. 302, 305 (1971).
81. R. COOLEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 376 (1914); Davis, Tort
Liability of Governmental Units, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 751, 773 (1956).
82. Y.B. 5 Edw. 4, 3 pl. 93 or 2 pl. 24 (1466), cited and quoted in Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass.
344, 346 (1877).
83. 96 S.2d 130 (Fla. 1957); see also, Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1198 (1958).
84. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1621 (1956); 1 E. KINKHEAD, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 181 (1903); F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, MATERIALS ON GOVERNMENT
IN URBAN AREAS 194-96 (1970); Prosser, supra note 4 at 977-78; James, Tort Liability of
Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 610, 623 (1955); Kramer, The
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Florida precedents and abolished the distinction."5
Even those states that retain the test have gradually modified it
and now allow extensive liability to be placed on the government
notwithstanding extensive governmental operations. For example,
in Parker v. City of Highland Park,86,87 the plaintiff, injured when
he fell through a glass door, received treatment at the publically
owned municipal hospital. He continued to suffer pain and subse-
quently went to a different hospital for treatment. A large piece of
glass was located in his back. He filed suit against the city and
alleged that the original doctor's nonfeasance, failure to x-ray his
back, created public liability.
The Michigan Supreme Court had previously held that operating
a hospital was a governmental function exception to those activities
sui generis governmental - of essence to governing.8
SPECIAL DEFENSES TRADITIONALLY AVAILABLE To GOVERNMENTS AND
OFFICERS FOR BREACH OF DUTY
Even where the government or its officer has breached a duty
owed directly to an individual, the plaintiff will be unable to recover
if a special defense protects the defendant from suit. When the
courts consider whether such a defense applies, as when they deal
with other aspects of public nonfeasance, they are interested in two
primary social goals: the promotion of effective and responsible gov-
ernment, and the dispersion of the cost of compensating injury
throughout the whole society.
The judicial means for accomplishing these goals have changed
with the size of government. Smaller governments needed protec-
tion from individual suits in order to operate effectively; large and
cumbersome modern governments need more prodding than protec-
tion. Responsive government is now more effectively promoted by
allowing a greater number of private actions than the early courts
Governmental Tort Immunity Doctrine in the United States, 1790-1955, 1966 U. ILL. L. F.
793, 816-18.
An extensive collection of cases allowing recovery appears in Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d 1079
(1951) (liability of county in connection with activities which pertain, or are claimed to
pertain, to private or proprietary function). It is difficult, however, to distinguish the cases
allowing recovery from those in which liability was not imposed. Additional cases on the test
are collected in Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 927 (1955) (state's immunity from liability as dependent
on governmental or proprietary function).
85. 96 So. 2d at 133.
86. 404 Mich. 183, 273 N.W.2d 413 (1978).
87. 404 Mich. at 27, 273 N.W.2d at 415.
88. But c.f. Perry v. Kalamazoo State Hospital, 404 Mich. 205, 273 N.W.2d 421 (1978)
(operation of mental hospital a governmental function).
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thought appropriate or useful. The goal of the courts remains the
same; only the means of achieving that goal have changed. As offi-
cers themselves become individually less important, because gov-
ernment employs greater and greater numbers of them, their im-
munity increases. 9 As government itself, rather than merely
through the acts of its officers, becomes increasingly responsible for
injury, its special defenses diminish. 0
There are various bases for the different public immunities. Sov-
ereign immunity is rooted in constraints on the power of courts.
Governmental and officer immunity are an outgrowth of the practi-
cal considerations of fiscal limitation and the fear of unlimited liti-
gation. The jurisdictional defense of sovereign immunity" protects
only the federal and state governments. The defense arises out of a
theoretical lack of power in the courts to compel the government to
do something against its will. President Jackson's legendary state-
ment in response to an unpopular Supreme Court decision empha-
sizes the reality of judicial weakness: "John Marshall has made his
decision. Now let him enforce it."92 Since the government itself
enforces the law it will do so against itself only to the extent it
chooses. Although the ancient maxim that "the king can do no
wrong" is often used as the basis for the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity, perhaps a more accurate formulation would be that "the
king can do whatever he pleases. 91 3
The rationale is clear. Law can be enforced only to the extent that
society is organized; only the organizing force can impose law on the
constituent parts of society, and it does so only to the extent it
chooses. If the organizing principle chooses not to enforce the law
against itself, there is no force available in society that can impose
the law on it. 4
89. See notes 65-67 supra and accompanying text.
90. See notes 48-50 supra and accompanying text.
91. For discussions of sovereign immunity, as applicable to actions for official nonfeas-
ance, see J. GRIFFITH & H. STREET, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 250 (5th ed. 1923);
PROSSER, supra note 5 §131 (4th ed. 1971); Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE
L.J. 1 (1924); Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44
U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1972).
92. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 30 (9th ed. 1975).
93. The "king can do no wrong" language represents the presumption of regularity in
government and is a basis for governmental immunity.
94. Justice Holmes summarized the idea in dicta:
Some doubts have been expressed as to the source of the immunity of a sovereign
power from suit without its own permission, but the answer has been public prop-
erty since before the days of Hobbes. . . . A sovereign is exempt from suit, not
because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law
19791
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Edelman v. Jordan5 reinforced the conceptual foundation of this
power theory of sovereign immunity. The Court chose to allow pro-
spective injunctive relief against a sovereign state but denied retro-
active damages for prior governmental failure to act. Although the
Court implied that it had the "moral authority" to order the sover-
eign to do what it ought to do in the future, the Court refrained from
saying that it had the power to compel the sovereign to pay damages
for past misdeeds."
The power theory of sovereign immunity helps explain two appar-
ent anomalies in the law of public immunity: both the king's officers
and small governmental units, principally cities, were traditionally
not immune from suit. 7 Sovereign immunity was generally held
on which the right depends.
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). See also 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 822
(M.Howe ed. 1953) where Justice Holmes wrote about attempting to force the legislative or
executive branches of government to do something against their will:
It seems to me like shaking one's fist at the sky, when the sky furnishes the energy
that enables one to raise the fist. There is a tendency to think of judges as if they
were independent mouthpieces of the infinite, and not simply directors of a force
that comes from the source that gives them their authority.
See generally David, Tort Liability of Local Government Alternatives to Immunity From
Liability or Suit, 6 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1959); Kennedy & Lynch, Some Problems of a
Sovereign Without Immunity, 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 161, 176 (1963) (government is not like
private sector because it undertakes enormous tasks; should not be held to same standard
as private parties because it attempts more difficult undertakings).
95. 415 U.S..651 (1974).
96. The result in Edelman was foreshadowed in an early treatise dealing with the sover-
eign's failure to act. In 1276 a commentator implied that the sovereign could be sued for
failure to pay a pension or certify a title to land, even though the sovereign clearly was
immune from suit in most areas.
THE MIRROR OF JUSTICES (c.1276), reprinted in 7 SELDEN SOCIETY REPRINTS 67 (1895). In the
same work the early treatise writer says that the king's court would be open to actions
"against the king and queen as against any other of the people .. " Id. at 11. Professor
Holdsworth cites a later yearbook reference also suggesting that the king could be enjoined
to act. Y.B. 9 Hy. VI, Pasch. pl. 7 (1438), cited in 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 18 N.1 (3d ed. 1944).
The courts thus had moral authority to command the king to perform future acts correctly
but no actual authority to compel payment for past wrongs. Centuries ago the courts exercised
self restraint in actions against the sovereign because the king's overwhelming power; today
the courts call the same restraint an implementation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
97. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (sovereign
immunity does not protect local government bodies). Cf. 18 E. McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS §53.08 (3d rev. ed. 1963) (cities' failure to act generally imposes no liability
even though sovereign immunity does not apply); 1 T. SHEARMAN & A. REDFIELD, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE (5th ed. 1898) (immunity of cities is not based on immunity of
sovereign but on idea that the government cannot be dispossessed of its property without its
consent); Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitutional Violations, 89
HARV. L. REV. 922, 931 (1976) (eleventh amendment has no application to municipalities).
But cf City of New Orleans v. Ker, 50 La. Ann. 413, 23 So. 384 (1898) (city liable for failure
to give owner of stock pound necessary money to operate pound) (dicta suggests that a
municipal corporation acting in its governmental nature is an agent of the state).
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inapplicable to these parties on the conceptual ground that they
were not sovereigns. However, the relatively insignificant power of
the king's officers and smaller governmental units seems an equally
plausible explanation for their inability to assert the defense.98 The
powerful sovereign could compel cities and officers to pay damage
awards imposed by the courts. No one could compel the sovereign
to pay.
Governmental and officer immunity are rooted in more practical
considerations. Governmental resources are limited. If liability were
imposed for all torts, governmental activity could be deterred..
Thus, the defenses insure that the mechanism thought to promote
effective government, increased liability, does not have a deleterious
effect.
These defenses are also based on a presumption of regularity in
government. This presumption follows from the maxim "the king
can do no wrong." Wrong acts result from selfish, non-public, mo-
tives. Since, in theory, the government does not act selfishly, it
should be presumed to act in the public good.
In jurisdictions where the sovereign is immune from direct suit
but is responsible for its officers' torts, plaintiffs may bring actions
against the government by naming a high-level officer as a nominal
defendant. A nominal defendant is a defendant in name only. His
actions giving rise to the suit were the direct implementation of the
government's policy decisions. He will be defended by government
attorneys and he will personally pay no damages. This well-
accepted legal fiction avoids the jurisdictional defense of sovereign
immunity." Governmental immunity, however, may remain avail-
98. See Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313 (1911) (state could compel city to pay damages
to victims of mob violence); B. WYMAN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW GOVERNING THE
RELATIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS 2 (1903); Crampton, Non-Statutory Review of Federal Admin-
istrative Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter
Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 MICH. L. REv. 387, 397 (1970); Vanlandingham, Local
Government Immunity Re-Examined, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 237, 239-42 (1966) (fact that legisla-
tures often re-enact immunity statutes after courts abolish immunity; suggests that sovereign
immunity involves conflict between separate branches of government and which branch has
proper authority); Comment, Illinois Tort Claims Act: A New Approach to Municipal Tort
Immunity in Illinois, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 265, 279 (1966) (certain legislative prerogatives should
not be questioned by the courts); cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (Congress
may eliminate state's sovereign immunity if state violates fourteenth amendment).
99. The question of whom the plaintiff is actually suing, the officer or the government, is
extremely complex and the subject of extensive litigation and commentary. See generally Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (eleventh amendment and injunctive suits against officers);
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) (principal early case on this point); Block, Suits
Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARv. L. REV. 1060,
1061 (1946); 435, 436 (1962); Whitehill, The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity:
Vagaries of a rederal Fiction, 10 TULSA L.J. 436 (1975).
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able as a defense for the government.
In Edelman v. Jordan, ,00 the Court sharply distinguished the use
of the nominal defendant fiction for prospective injunctive relief
from its use for the retrospective relief of damages. Edelman granted
injunctive relief compelling the defendant state's prospective con-
formity with HEW time limits; retroactive damages were denied.
The Court reasoned that forcing other branches of government to
obey the law in the future was a matter capable of sustaining judi-
cial intervention based only on the fiction of the nominal defendant;
the far more serious issue of forcing other branches of government
to pay a penalty for past failure to act could not be decided based
only on this fictional foundation.'0 '
DISPARATE TYPES OF PUBLIC NONFEASANCE AND THE ARGUMENT By
ANALOGY 1O2
Governmental liability for nonfeasance is expanding. However,
because the law is still developing, a jurisdiction may lack precedent
permitting recovery for a specific kind of nonfeasance. This lack of
case law need not prevent a court from holding the government
liable. Concepts from other areas of governmental nonfeasance can
be employed to justify holding for the plaintiff.
Upon casual analysis, no connection between the separate areas
of law seems apparent. A jurisdiction's cases on failure to repair
roads, for example, may not appear relevant in actions seeking the
payment of public welfare benefits. Several fundamental relation-
ships, however, do exist. In all areas of nonfeasance the action is
brought because the government failed to act. The defenses in all
areas will generally be the same, namely, sovereign, governmental,
or officer immunity. Moreover, the underlying policy concerns influ-
encing courts gradually to broaden public liability are identical in
all of these cases despite the striking differences in factual situa-
tions. For these reasons the criteria used to justify or bar recovery
in one area is often applicable to another.
Most of the cases fall into six categories: failure to supervise,
inspect, license, protect, warn or repair. Each of these areas of pub-
lic nonfeasance will now be discussed so that the possibility of
applying concepts from one area to another can be explored.
100. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
101. In Quern v. Jordan, __ U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 1139 (1979), a follow-up case to Edel-
man, the Court reiterated this distinction between prospective and retroactive relief.
102. The argument by legal analogy is suggested in K. LLEWEL.YN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION 82-84 (1960).
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Failure to Supervise Adequately
The government or an officer may fail to supervise the activities
of employees or other individuals. 03 Where this failure results in an
injury, some courts will find a duty owed directly to the plaintiff if
he relied on the superior knowledge of the government or public
officer.
The cases demonstrate that as the element of reliance increases,
the likelihood of individual recovery also increases.1'0 For example,
the government repeatedly has been found liable for the failure of
teachers to supervise. The element of reliance here is clear. 0 5 Man-
datory schooling forces parents to rely on the government to protect
their children. Another form of forced reliance has permitted electri-
cal linemen to recover. Since electricity cannot be seen, the linemen
necessarily relied on their superiors to turn off the current.1"' The
reliance element was also evident where individuals drowned be-
cause the government failed to provide lifeguards. 07
Failure to Inspect
Some of the most difficult cases involving public nonfeasance
concern the failure to adequately inspect food, drugs, or publicly
103. See, e.g., Jordan v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 204 (S.D. Ga. 1968) (failure to
supervise fumigation of truck); Austin W. Jones Co. v. State, 122 Me. 214, 119 A. 577 (1923)
(failing to supervise mental patient who set fire to plaintiff's store).
104. In three cases in which the government was held not liable the lack of governmental
liability was phrased as an absence of duty. The plaintiff cannot claim reliance on govern-
ment action where the government had no duty to act. See Blaber v. United States, 212 F.
Supp. 95 (E.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 332 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1964) (government's duty to supervise
with regard to burning lumps of thorium was discretionary); Robbins v. Scarborough, 181 Il.
App. 58 (1913) (trustees of school board duty to check treasurer's books was a duty to the
public); Brogan v. City of Philadelphia, 346 Pa. 208, 29 A.2d 671 (1943) (police duty was to
maintain unobstructed roadway not to stop boys from throwing mortar at passerby); see also
Brooks v. Jacobs, 139 Me. 371, 31 A.2d 414 (1943) (failed to provide students safe place from
which to shovel snow); Gardner v. State, 281 N.Y. 212, 22 N.E.2d 344 (1939) (failed to instruct
child on how to do headstand).
105. Morris v. Ortiz, 3 Ariz. App. 399, 415 P.2d 114 (1966), vacated on other grounds, 103
Ariz. 119, 437 P.2d 652 (1968) (teacher not liable after he failed to watch shop students).
Contra, Desmaris v. Wachusett Regional School Dist., 350 Mass. 591, 276 N.E.2d 691 (1971)
(teacher not liable after failing to instruct child on wearing goggles). For a detailed discussion
of the status in Illinois of teachers' failure to supervise, see Comment, The In Loco Parentis
Status of Illinois Schoolteachers: An Unjustifiably Broad Extension of Immunity, 10 J. MAs.
J. 599, 611-20 (1977). See also Gerrity v. Beatty, 71 Ill. 2d 47, 373 N.E.2d 1323 (1978) (coaches
allowed "parental" defense).
106. See United States v. Pierce, 235 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1956); Dudley v. Community
Publ. Serv. Co., 108 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1939); McGarry v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 525
(D. Nev. 1973) (detailed discussion of many electricity cases).
107. E.g., Brown v. United States, 99 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.W.Va. 1951). But cf. Boucher v.
Fuhlbruck, 26 Conn. Supp. 79, 213 A.2d 455 (1965) (no liability when park officials had
decided not to provide lifeguard at river running thorugh city park).
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owned property. In these cases the injured plaintiff relies on an
implicit government assurance of safety following inspection. Al-
though numerous cases deny recovery by reasoning that the reliance
of the injured victim creates no greater duty toward the victim than
toward the general public, an increasing number of cases indicate
that the traditional approach is no longer appropriate.' 8 As people
place greater reliance on the government, and reasonably expect it
to do what it says it will do, the government's mere failure to act
responsibly will often produce injury. Since the courts are clearly
moving toward more compensation for individual injury, recovery
follows.
A stunning modern case, Griffin v. United States, 09 epitomizes
this general broadening trend, though perhaps the facts of the case
indicate that the government may well have been guilty of misfeas-
ance as well as nonfeasance. Griffin allowed recovery to a woman
who had relied upon the government's inspection of a batch of polio
vaccine. The inspection was inadequate and contaminants in the
drug administered to the plaintiff completely paralyzed her. In a
long and detailed opinion, the court rejected the government's de-
fense that the duty was owed only to the general public. The court
reasoned that the government had assumed a tremendous responsi-
bility by agreeing to certify the safety of drugs. Individuals had a
legal right to rely on that certification. A legal obligation for the
benefit of another was created by the government's undertaking the
108. Following the rationale of several cases imposing liability when food inspectors failed
adequately to inspect, Tardos v. Bozant, 1 La. Ann. 199 (1846) (meat); Nickerson v. Thomp-
son, 33 Me. 433 (1851) (fish); Hayes v. Porter, 22 Me. 268 (1843) (meat), the courts have often
allowed recovery to an individual victim of an inspector's failure, finding the duty to be owed
specifically to the injured individual. See Whitlock v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 1020
(E.D.Va 1969) (railroad brakes); Patrick v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 340 (S.D. Cal. 1950)
(underwater boat for gas leaks); Sava v. Fuller, 249 Cal. 2d 281, 57 Cal. Rptr. 312 (1967)
(poisonous substance eaten by child); Whitt v. Reed, 239 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1951) (water pipe
system; drinking fountain erupted boiling water in child's face); Runkel v. City of New York,
282 App. Div. 173, 123 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1953) (did not seal off building after inspectors con-
demned it); Metildi v. State, 177 Misc. 179, 30 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1941) (retaining wall). Recovery
denied: People ex rel Trust Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 132 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1942) (contami-
nated water pumped to state hospital); Anglo-American & Overseas Corp. v. United States,
144 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 242 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1957) (poison in tomato paste);
Russell & Tucker v. United States, 34 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1940) (ticks on cows); Brooks
v. University of N.C., 2 N.C. App. 157, 162 S.E.2d 616 (1968) (contaminated collard greens);
Antin v. Union High School Dist. No. 2, 130 Or. 461, 280 P. 664 (1929) (exploding hot water
tank); Annot. 41 A.L.R. 3d 567 (1972) (numerous cases suggest no liability for building
inspector's failure to find defects).
109. 351 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modified, 454 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1974) (negligence
per se by Pennsylvania law). See also Note, The Federal Seal of Approval; Government
Liability for Negligent Inspection, 62 GEO. L.J. 937 (1974).
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inspection. This obligation flowed directly to the plaintiff.
Nonetheless, a clear majority of the cases holds that the failure
to inspect - particularly the failure to inspect buildings - is a
breach of a duty owed only to the public."0 Liability generally does
not follow this type of public nonfeasance. It would seem, however,
that the general trend of broadening public liability will gradually
influence the inspection cases.
Failure to License
Reliance on superior knowledge or expertise is the primary focus
in the cases involving the failure to supervise or to inspect. That
element is utilized by the courts to permit recovery without opening
up the government to potentially limitless liability. However, consi-
derations of reliance disappear from the courts' discussions in cases
dealing with the government's failure to act upon license requests
made by private citizens. Although there is actually a forced rela-
tionship in the license situations, one which could almost be charac-
terized as mandatory reliance,"' the courts rarely find that a duty
is owed directly to the person seeking the license. A sense of fairness
would suggest that a duty should be imposed upon the government
to act, since the government's failure to act results in the inability
of the person seeking the license to act. Nonetheless, the courts have
not analyzed the facts in that manner.
At least as early as 1672 people were having difficulty getting
cooperation from the government regarding licenses. The early cases
often involved applications for tavern licenses. In Stephens v.
Watson"' the court implied that the people issuing the licenses had
a duty to promote order and stability in society and that this was
the purpose of licensing taverns; the duty flowed not to the tavern
owner but to the public. No recovery was allowed. Later cases have
110. United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961) (FHA inspector failed to discover
serious defect and plaintiffs suffered economic loss); Copeland v. United States, 347 F. Supp.
247 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (slow leak was not discovered in gas heater; occupants of low-income
housing killed); Marr v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Okla. 1969) (failure to estab-
lish adequate procedure for inspecting aircraft); Little Rock v. Holland, 184 Ark. 381, 42
S.W.2d 383 (1931) (superior inspector failed to examine light pole and lineman injured be-
cause of pole's rotted condition); Quintan v. Industrial Comm'n, 178 Colo. 131, 495 P.2d 1137
(1972) (failure to inspect machinery); Mead v. City of New Haven, 40 Conn. 72 (1873) (failure
to inspect boiler); Modlin v. City of Miami Beach, 201 So.2d 70 (Fla. 1967) (inspector failed
to detect danger in structure); Rivera v. City of Amsterdam, 6 App. Div. 2d 637, N.Y.S.2d
530 (1958) (city inspectors knew about danger from faulty stove but failed to correct problem
until after explosion and death); Chastaine v. State, 160 Misc. 828, 290 N.Y.S. 789 (1936)
(failure to inspect elevator properly).
111. "Mandatory reliance" because the applicant must obtain a license or not operate.
112. 91 Eng. Rep. 44 (K.B. 1672).
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applied the same rationale in situations in which its applicability
is less obvious, and this 300 year old case states the modern rule." 3
A subtle consideration in nonfeasance license cases may help dis-
tinguish the pattern of non-recovery in these cases from the general,
overall broadening trend in actions for public nonfeasance. A person
or business entity applying for a license will suffer only economic
loss if the public officer fails to act on the request. The liberal trend
of the nonfeasance cases in other areas is supported by a dispropor-
tionate number of personal injury actions. The courts are necessar-
ily less protective of people's economic rights than their personal
injury actions. Courts wishing to move to greater liability have long
realized that severe personal injury is a much stronger foundation
upon which to build expansive legal precedent.
Failure to Provide Protection Against the Criminal Acts of Others
The courts have repeatedly been faced with the difficult problem
of determining to whom a duty is owed in situations involving the
government's failure to protect individuals from the physical at-
tacks of others. The courts are troubled by two distinct considera-
tions: first, the government cannot, nor does it necessarily wish to,
enforce all the criminal laws completely; second, the number of
potential plaintiffs is virtually limitless. These factors have com-
pelled many courts to determine that the duty is owed only to the
public.
The cases on failure to protect fall into two distinct categories: the
failure to protect prisoners or people in mental hospitals from each
other; and the failure to protect members of the public from prison-
ers or other criminals. One striking fact emerges from a study of the
two categories: although prisoners traditionally have been consid-
ered second class citizens, with a corresponding decrease in their
legal rights,"' they are almost equally likely to recover for their
113. E.g., Monmier v. Godbold, 116 La. 165, 40 So. 604 (1906) (pharmacy license); Jaf-
farian v. Murphy, 280 Mass. 402, 183 N.E. 110 (1932) (minature golf license); Meinecke v.
McFarland, 122 Mont. 515, 206 P.2d 1012 (1949) (hunting license blanks); Annot., 37
A.L.R.2d 694 (1954)
However, in a number of cases in which the plaintiff has been able to show a particularly
malicious attitude in the officer or a complete lack of guidelines for deciding who will get a
license, courts have held that the duty was owed to the individual plaintiff. Although these
cases touch almost upon misfeasance, they are instructive. See Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d
605 (5th Cir. 1964) (court ordered specific regulations drawn up to prevent discrimination
against individual with no political clout); Young v. Hansen, 118 Ill. App. 2d 1, 249 N.E.2d
300 (1969) (taxi driver proved conspiracy between police and licensing board); Lehan v.
Greigg, 257 Iowa 823, 135 N.W.2d 80 (1965) (officers liable after reissuing license to repeatedly
convicted felon).
114. See generally Prisons on Trial: A Symposium on the Changing Law of Corrections,
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injuries as are innocent third persons. This treatment results from
the conjunction of two elements at work in the courts' deliberations.
Although innocent third persons have the sympathy of the courts to
a greater extent than do assaulted prisoners, the courts must con-
sider the unlimited number of potential victims outside of the
prison or hospital. The courts fear "infinite actions for one de-
fault.""' 5 Within the prison institution itself, however, the number
of victims remains strictly limited. Thus, lack of sympathy is bal-
anced by the potentially limited number of lawsuits.
Two actions in the state courts illustrate the opposing positions
in cases involving attacks on fellow prisoners. In Kelly v. Ogilvie, "'
the Illinois Supreme Court held that the duty to protect prisoners
from each other was a duty owed to the public rather than to the
individual. The court refused to hold that the state's duty was owed
to the individually injured plaintiff. Upchurch v. State"7 represents
the opposite view. The Upchurch court concluded, on facts quite
similar to those in Kelly, that a duty was owed to the prisoner and
not only to the public. The court analyzed the problem of to whom
the duty was owed by discussing the discretionary/ministerial di-
chotomy."8 The decision to draw up specific safety rules and regula-
tions for promoting prison safety was discretionary and defeated any
claim that a duty existed. However, the failure to implement the
new rules and regulations once they were adopted was a ministerial
act to which liability could be attached. Although Kelly's restrictive
approach still represents the majority position, Upchurch appar-
ently is more representative of the current tendency toward broader
liability in these cases. '
21 BUFFALO L. REV. 641 (1972); Symposium: Prisons and Prisoners, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 995
(1972).
115. William's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 163, 165 (K.B. 1592).
116. 35 Il. 2d 297, 220 N.E.2d 174 (1966).
117. 51 Haw. 150, 454 P.2d 112 (1969).
118. See notes 31-43 supra and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1954) (cause of action stated
under Federal Tort Claims Act for failing to provide sufficient guards in hospital); Thomas
v. Williams, 105 Ga. App. 321, 124 S.E.2d 409 (1962) (liability for failure to search drunken
prisoner who set himself on fire); Roberts v. State, 159 Ind. App. 456, 307 N.E.2d 501 (1974)
(potential liability for lack of prison guards' random shooting); Farmer v. State ex rel. Rus-
sell, 224 Miss. 96, 79 So.2d 528 (1955) (liable because did not obtain medical treatment for
prisoner); Scolavino v. State, 297 N.Y. 460, 74 N.E.2d 174 (1947) (mental patient); Taylor v.
Slaughter, 171 Okla. 152, 42 P.2d 235 (1935) (liable for failure to protect from prison
"kangaroo court"); Johnson v. Hamilton County, 156 Tenn. 298, 1 S.W.2d 528 (1927) (officer
liable for failing to take razor blades from insane patient); Hale v. Johnston, 140 Tenn. 182,
203 S.W. 949 (1918) (liable for failure to know of unsafe conditions in jail); Kusah v. McCor-
kle, 100 Wash. 318, 170 P. 1023 (1918) (liable for failure to take weapons from cell mate).
Contra, Thiele v. Kennedy, 18 I1. App. 3d 465, 309 N.E.2d 394 (1974) (good faith decision
19791
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But despite this broadening liability, courts concerned with gov-
ernmental fiscal limitations may be restrictive when deciding cases
involving the failure to protect innocent third persons. In Riss v.
City of New York, 110 the city was held not liable after failing to
protect a young woman from the violent assaults of her mentally
disturbed ex-boyfriend. The victim repeatedly asked for police pro-
tection after receiving numerous threats from the ex-boyfriend but
her request was refused. She was told to call the police again after
she was assaulted. The Court of Appeals of New York, which had
been in the forefront of the case law trend of broadening public
liability'' stated the reason for its decision simply:
[tihe amount of protection that may be provided is limited by the
resources of the community and by a considered legislative deci-
sion as to how those resources may be deployed.' '2
Riss suggests the dangers of broad public liability. None of the
traditional public defenses was available. Sovereign immunity had
been abolished in New York. The decision not to provide police
protection was made negligently and foolishly at a very low level of
the New York Police Department and could hardly be considered
discretionary rather than ministerial. Only the ultimate policy
question governing public lawsuits remained as a defense. Govern-
ment is supposed to accomplish the goals it sets for itself; whatever
not to guard protects officer from liability); Kamisky v. State, 245 App.Div. 904, 282 N.Y.S.
496 (1935) (prison "squealer"); Stinnett v. City of Sherman, 43 S.W. 847 (Tex. Civ. App.
1897) (failure to prevent prisoner from being confined with crazy person). See Annot., 41
A.L.R.3d 1021 (1972). The question of failure to protect prisoners from each other may also
arise in a constitutional context in civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1976).
120. 22 N.Y.2d 579, 283 N.Y.S.2d 897, 240 N.E.2d 860 (1968). The reasoning implicit in
Riss has been implemented in a number of other cases involving the failure to protect inno-
cent third persons. See Jamison v. McCurrie, 388 F. Supp. 990 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (no liability
for failure by police to incarcerate man who killed plaintiff's decedent; inaction not a consti-
tutional violation); Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969) (no
liability after serious accident when police officers had followed but not stopped a reckless
and speeding driver); Huey v. Town of Cicero, 41 Ill. 2d 361, 243 N.E.2d 214 (1969) (no
liability when city failed to provide protection for black child in community disrupted by
racial tension). See generally Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 1084 (1972) (liability of municipality or
other governmental unit for failure to provide police protection).
121. For an example of New York decisions illustrating the abandonment of sovereign
immunity, see Jones v. State, 267 App. Div. 254, 45 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1943) (state liable after
failing to prevent escape of dangerous insane prisoner). The trend in the law clearly seems to
be toward imposing greater liability upon the state for injury caused by escaped prisoners.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Gallatin County, 418 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1969) (plaintiff allowed to recover
from sheriff after prisoner escaped).
122. 22 N.Y.2d 579, 581-82, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 898, 240 N.E.2d 860 (1968).
123. 86 Nev. 911, 478 P.2d 591 (1970); but cf. Williams v. State, 308 N.Y. 548, 127 N.E.2d
545 (1955) (New York, after abolishing sovereign immunity, not liable when prisoner escaped
from good conduct work farm, and decedent died from fright in subsequent encounter).
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judicial means promote that end are appropriate. In Riss the court's
vision of potential liability imposed on the state by all the victims
following in Riss' steps forced the court to conclude that the duty
was owed to the public and not to the plaintiff. The Riss case sug-
gests that the government's duty to the public is nothing less than
the obligation to benefit as many people as possible within the
government's fiscal limitations.
Two years after Riss, the Nevada court reached an essentially
opposite conclusion. The innocent plaintiff in State v. Silva was
raped by an escaped prisoner. Shortly before the rape, a prison
officer had been faced with the decision of leaving open the gates of
his minimum security honor camp to allow firefighting trucks easy
access to the only local water supply. He decided to open the gates
and the prisoner escaped. The court rejected all of the state's defen-
ses, including the state's attempt to disclaim any duty at all by
characterizing the decision to open the gates as discretionary. The
duty to prevent escape was owed to the victim as well as to the
general public. Thus, the private law of negligence replaced the
public law of immunity.
New York's perceived difficulties with the broadening of liability,
set out in Riss, did not deter the Silva court in sparsely-populated
Nevada. Perhaps the limited number of potential victims in Nevada
may explain the differences in result from that reached in the Riss
case. Because Nevada has far fewer citizens to protect than New
York City, the Nevada court could reasonably conclude that failure
to protect innocent people could be translated into public liability
without excessive fear that the government would be financially
crippled by potential litigation.12'
124. Additional cases involving the failure to protect suggest the number of potential
victims will not always mandate non-recovery. As early as 1911, the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of statutory imposition of' liability on counties' failure to prevent mob
action even though the number of victims was potentially unlimited. City of Chicago v.
Sturges, 222 U.S. 313 (1911). See extensive collections of later cases at Annot., 26 A.L.R.3d
1142 (1969) (municipal liability for personal injury or death under mob violence or anti-
lynching statutes); Annot., 26 A.L.R.3d 1198 (1969) (municipal liability for property damage
under mob violence statutes).
It is extremely difficult to distinguish the factual situations in cases imposing liability from
those in which liability is denied. Compare Gibson v. United States, 457 F.2d 1391 (3d Cir.
1972) (government liable when job camp administration failed to provide adequate protection
and staff members were killed by enrollee) and Swanner v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 1183
(M.D. Ala. 1970) (government liable for failing to protect special employee/undercover agent)
and Porter v. City of Decatur, 16 Il1. App. 3d 1031, 307 N.E.2d 440 (1974) (failure to provide
officer to direct traffic on corner when officials knew a large convoy was about to pass through
found to be willful and wanton conduct and not immunized by statute) and McLeod v. Grant
County School Dist., 42 Wash.2d 316, 255 P.2d 360 (1953) (government liable after failing to
prevent rape of twelve-year-old girl by schoolmate in gymnasium at recess) with Tilden v.
19791
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Failure to Warn
If the cases involving the government's failure to protect are con-
cerned with fiscal limitations, it would seem that a decrease in the
public cost of preventing injury in another area should incline the
courts toward imposing broader liability, especially if the govern-
ment failed to perform out of mere inadvertence rather than cost-
consciousness. However, in a series of cases involving only minimal
preventive cost to society, cases involving the failure to warn, the
courts are as divided as in any other area of public nonfeasance. The
courts appear not to be impressed with the lost cost of warning.
Instead, the potential cost of damages for failure to warn is more
likely to influence their decisions.
When a warning need only be directed toward an individual, the
courts have found that the governmental duty flows directly to the
individual victim and not to the public and the individual victim
can recover. In Fair v. United States,125 for example, the federal
government was held liable when military doctors failed to warn a
threatened victim that they were about to release a homicidal pa-
tient. An individual duty was owed to the decedent because the
victim was the only person likely to be harmed by the patient.
This aspect of duty was also discussed in the controversial Calif-
United States, 365 F.2d 148 (7th Cir. 1966) (no liability when base commander failed to
comply with his promise not to allow dangerous enlisted man off the camp grounds) and
Mancha v. Field Museum, 5 111. App. 3d 699, 283 N.E.2d 899 (1972) (statute provided immun-
ity after officers had failed to protect child in museum from vicious assault by other children)
and LeMenager v. Fitzgerald, 1 Ill. App. 3d 803, 274 N.E.2d 913 (1971) (statute immunized
officers when police failed to protect against fire of incendiary origin) and Keane v. Chicago,
98 I1. App. 2d 460, 240 N.E.2d 321 (1968) (before immunity statute enacted, city not liable
for failing to provide adequate police protection in school) and Schuster v. City of New York,
286 App. Div. 389, 143 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1955) (city not liable when police were informed of
threats on informer's life and failed to provide protection).
Several cases have dealt with the problem of the government's failure to prevent suicides.
Compare Dinnerstein v. United States, 486 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1973) (government liable because
government hospital had knowledge of suicidal tendencies but failed to take precautions) and
Lange v. United States, 179 F. Supp. 777 (N.D.N.Y. 1960) (government liable when precau-
tions were ordered but staff failed to put them into effect) and Lawrence v. State, 44 Misc.
2d 756, 255 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1964) (liable after failing to put bars on second floor window of
man with known suicidal traits) with Baker v. United States, 343 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1965)
(no liability when government had no way to foresee that patient would attempt suicide) and
Anderberg v. Newman, 5 fI1. App. 3d 736, 283 N.E.2d 904 (1972) (decision to release mental
patient who subsequently committed suicide was discretionary function and no liability could
be imposed on officer) and Kates v. State, 47 Misc.2d 176, 261 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1965) (no
liability due to unforseeability of patient's suicide attempt). See generally Schwartz, Civil
Liability for Causing Suicide: A Synthesis of Law and Psychiatry, 24 VAN. L. REv. 217 (1971);
Note, Hospital's Duty to Protect Mental Patient From Suicide, 29 LA. L. REv. 558 (1969)
(what constitutes reasonable care for hospitals regarding suicidal patients).
125. 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956).
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ornia case, Johnson v. State,' in which youth authorities failed to
warn foster parents of a child's known violent tendencies.'27 Because
the warning could be directed at specific individuals, in this case the
foster parents, rather than to the general public, the court reasoned
that a general duty to warn had been converted into a specific
obligation to one set of individuals. This specific responsibility sup-
ported liability.
In lawsuits involving failure to protect, when the number of po-
tential victims is sufficiently limited, the courts reason that the
potential threat of massive litigation against the state does not pose
sufficient danger. Judicial desire to compensate for injury thus con-
trols. However, once the warning must be directed at the general
public rather than at a limited and specific group of individuals or
for a specific and unique danger, the courts dramatically limit re-
covery. 28
126. 69 Cal. 2d 782, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 447 P.2d 352 (1968).
127. Although Johnson was decided primarily on the issue of whether a discretionary
decision had been made not to warn the foster parents, the court felt tliat the duty owed to
the individuals overrode any discretion involved. But cf. Martinez v. State, 85 Cal. App. 3d
430, 149 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1978) (violent parolee murdered plaintiff's daughter; California
statute shielded government officials from liability). The United States Supreme Court will
review the decision. 47 U.S.L.W. 3757 (1979).
128. Compare Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 931 (1967) (though decision to establish air traffic control system was discretionary,
once system was in operation, failure to warn made government liable) and United States v.
State, 351 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1965) (no discretionary protection provided government when
officers failed to put warning lights on electric wires near runway) with National Mfg. Co. v.
United States, 210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1954) (no liability after failing to warn residents of
oncoming flood). Compare also Martin v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 243 (C.D. Cal. 1975)
(government liable for failing to give campers special warning about bears when garbage
dumps were temporarily closed down) with Rubenstein v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 654
(N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 488 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1973) (normal warning to campers was suffi-
cient when conditions were not unusual).
Cases have imposed liability on the government or a public officer, despite the large num-
ber of potential victims, for failing to place warning signs or traffic signals. Hernandez v.
United States, 112 F. Supp. 369 (D. Hawaii 1953) (placing roadblock but not giving adequate
warning); Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963) (failing to
remove signs indicating turn in road after road had been straightened); Teall v. City of
Cudahy, 60 Cal. 2d 421, 34 Cal. Rptr. 869, 386 P.2d 492 (1963) (failing to provide city traffic
light at dangerous intersection); Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 55, 284 N.E.2d 733 (1972) (failing
to place yellow line in road); Canepa v. State, 306 N.Y. 272, 117 N.E.2d 550 (1954) (failing
to place signs and guardrails when straight road suddenly curved); Gurevitch v. State, 285
App. Div. 863, 136 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1955) (failing to replace stop sign); Rugg v. State, 284 App.
Div. 179, 131 N.Y.S.2d 2 (1954) (failing to mark curve in road on approach to narrow bridge);
Brennan v. State, 64 Misc. 2d 213, 314 N.Y.S.2d 738 (1970) (failing to remove lighting on
road which created illusion that road continued straight beyond detour); cf. Perry v. City of
Santa Monica, 130 Cal. App. 2d 370, 279 P.2d 92 (1955) (no liability for failing to provide
appropriate and sufficient traffic signal); Hermann v. City of Chicago, 16 Ill. App. 3d 696,
306 N.E.2d 516 (1973) (no liability when state failed to put up height clearance on underpass);
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Failure to Repair
Actions involving the failure to repair raise the issue of the gov-
ernment's fiscal limitations with persuasive forcefulness. Mainte-
nance of roads, bridges or other publicly-owned structures involves
substantial expenditures. By broadly imposing a duty in this area,
courts would be creating an unfulfillable requirement.'
The cases on failure to repair focus on several essential argu-
ments. The government argues that the duty is owed only to the
public. The plaintiff counters that maintenance of roads and build-
ings is a proprietary rather than governmental function. Finally, the
government concludes by underscoring its fiscal limitations. The
real issue, whether the government has been negligent in failing to
repair, rarely receives attention. But, since the test of negligence is
Genkinger v. Jefferson County, 250 Iowa 118, 93 N.W.2d 130 (1958) (no liability for failure to
place guardrail or signs). See also Annot., 161 A.L.R. 1404 (1946).
Additional public nonfeasance cases involve the alteration of natural conditions and failure
to warn of the change. See, e.g., Jessup v. State, 16 Ill. Ct. Cl. 227 (1947) (state liable after
failing to light or gudard an open ditch); Bean v. City of Moberly, 350 Mo. 975, 169 S.W.2d
393 (1943) (city not liable for failure to follow ordinance requiring city to barricade and light
open ditch); Bennett v. Whitney, 94 N.Y. 302 (1884) (officer personally liable for failing to
light ditch); Koerth v. Borough of Turtle Creek, 355 Pa. 121, 49 A.2d 398 (1946) (city not liable
for failing to order property owner to maintain sidewalk in reasonably safe condition).
129. It is, of course, impossible for the government to keep all roads and buildings in
perfect repair and a judicial requirement thereof (accomplished by allowing extensive litiga-
tion for failure to repair), would certainly defeat the overall judicial goal of achieving responsi-
ble and efficient government. The number of cases denying liability attests to this considera-
tion. In re Silver Bridge Disaster Litigation, 381 F. Supp. 931 (S.D.W.Va. 1974) (no federal
liability for failing to take preventive action when federal officers knew of defects in state-
owned bridge); Deren v. City of Carbondale, 13 ll. App. 3d 473, 300 N.E.2d 590 (1973) (city
immune despite officer's knowledge of exceptionally heavy pedestrian traffic); Morrissey v.
State, 2 IllCt.Cl. 254 (1914) (bridge collapse); Hill v. City of Boston, 122 Mass. 344 (1877)
(no liability for failing to maintain school stairway); Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9
Mass. 247 (1812) (earliest American case on this point); Stevens v. North States Motor, Inc.,
161 Minn. 345, 201 N.W. 435 (1925) (road overseer not liable for failure to repair); Bollard v.
Gihlstorf, 134 Minn. 41, 158 N.W. 725 (1916) (highway officials not liable for failing to repair
or warn of disrepair); Dosdall v. County Comm'rs, 30 Minn. 96, 14 N.W. 458 (1882) (county
not liable after plaintiff fell through broken sidewalk on courthouse premises); Flynn v. N.C.
State Highway and Pub. Works Comm'n 244 N.C. 617, 94 S.E.2d 571 (1956) (no recovery
allowed when truck fell off nonrepaired road); Hipp v. Ferrall, 173 N.C. 167, 91 S.E. 831
(1917) (no liability for failing to repair bridge because injury suffered was not a particular
injury unique to plaintiff); Binkley v. Hughes, 168 Tenn. 86, 73 S.W.2d 1111 (1934) (no
liability because decision to repair bridge is discretionary function); Fryar v. Hamilton
County, 160 Tenn. 216, 22 S.W.2d 353 (1929) (no liability for failure to repair roads without
showing of willful nonfeasance); Brooke's Abridgement, Y.B. 5 Edw. IV 3 pl. 93 (1466) cited
in Hill v. City of Boston, 122 Mass. 344, 346 (1877) (earliest reference to this type of public
nonfeasance found); Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d 1079, 1083 (1951). For explicit early discussions of
the relation of the fiscal limitations of governments to liability for failure to repair, compare
Henly v. Mayor of Lyme, 130 Eng. Rep. 995 (H.L. 1828) [also reported at 6 Eng. Rep. 1180
(1834)] (liable for failure to repair a sea wall) with Garlinghouse v. Jacobs, 29 N.Y. 297 (1864)
(no liability because failure to repair bridge was excused by lack of funds).
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slowly becoming the rule of public liability in other areas of nonfeas-
ance, it is not unreasonable to expect that the negligence issue will
gradually appear more frequently in these cases.
The Supreme Court attempted to develop a test for municipal
liability for failure to repair at an early date. In Weightman v.
Corporation of Washington,'30 the Court established a three-fold
test: an individual plaintiff may recover if the city is a corporation;
if the city's charter accepts liability in tort for nonfeasance; and if
the plaintiff can show a specific injury unique to himself. The spe-
cific injury requirement involves the same public policy considera-
tion discussed throughout this article: recovery will be allowed to an
individual as the personal recipient of a duty only if that recovery
furthers the overall judicial purpose of promoting effective govern-
ment.
Two modern decisions represent the general trend toward broad-
ening liability in the area of failure to repair. Though clearly still
in the minority, these cases suggest the methods that some courts
have used to expand public liability. 3' In Milstrey v. City of
130. 66 U.S. (1 Black) 39 (1861).
131. Various cases have allowed recovery against the governmental unit or public officers
for failing to repair. See Estrada v. Hills, 401 F. Supp. 429 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (low-level HUD
administrators potentially liable and not protected by discretionary function exception when
they failed to have a dangerous building demolished); Baldwin v. State, 6 Cal. 3d 424, 99
Cal. Rptr. 145, 491 P.2d 1121 (1972) (overturned previous law) (state found liable for failing
to correct design of highway when officials deemed conditions had changed and design was
no longer safe) (see Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 875 (1972), for a large collection of cases indicating
California's minority position in allowing recovery for this type of failure to repair); Rodrigues
v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970) (liability for overflow; no discretionary immunity
because maintenance of highway culverts is an everyday function); Strickfaden v. Green
Creek Highway Dist., 42 Id. 738, 248 P. 456 (1926) (highway district may be liable for damage
from failure to repair road); Consolidated Apartment House Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 131
Md. 523, 102 A. 920 (1917) (street commissioner escaped personal liability for failing to
remove ashes and refuse from building, but board members who had ordered him not to clean
building were held liable); Allas v. Borough of Rumson, 115 N.J. 593, 181 A. 175 (1935) (city
liable for failure to put rail on public ramp; misfeasance, not nonfeasance); Hover v. Bar-
khoof, 44 N.Y. 113 (1870) (commissioner liable after failing to repair bridge); Robinson v.
Chamberlain, 34 N.Y. 389 (1866) (officer held liable when he failed to keep canal lock in
operating condition); Hathaway v. Hinton, 46 N.C. 227 (1 Jones 243) (1853) (overseer liable
after stage coach fell through bridge); Ball v. Village of Reynoldsburg, 86 Ohio App. 337, 176
N.E.2d 739 (1960) (city liable for failing to clean out sewer); Wensel v. North Versailles
Township, 136 Pa. Super. Ct. 485, 7 A.2d 590 (1939) (failure to repair road subjected city to
liability when road collapsed under five-mile-per-hour traffic); Fosbre v. State, 70 Wash. 2d
578, 424 P.2d 901 (1967) (state liable after failing to repair log boom which caused boat to go
out of control); Mayor of Lynn v. Turner, 98 Eng. Rep. 980 (K.B. 1774) (city liable after failing
to clean clogged stream). Contra, Pluhowsky v. City of New Haven, 151 Conn. 337, 197 A.2d
645 (1964) (no liability when street superintendent failed to remove accumulated water from
street because of discretionary function exception); Smith v. Iowa City, 213 Iowa 391, 239
N.W. 29 (1931) (no liability after failing to keep teeter-totter in safe condition); Casey v.
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Hackensack,'31 the court faced the problem of a city without a stat-
ute specifically accepting liability in tort. The court concluded that
the city was not liable for the nonfeasance alleged, failing to repair
a hole in the sidewalk. Nonetheless, the plaintiff recovered because
the court held the city liable for the positive act of creating a nuis-
ance. This is similar to the reasoning used two hundred fifty years
earlier in the Earl of Shrewsbury's Case:13 3 the failure to act itself is
not tortious but is logically connected to a resulting tort.
A similar method of avoiding the traditional governmental im-
munity of a city was employed in Sable v. City of Detroit. 131 Detroit
had enacted traditional barriers to liability for public nonfeasance,
particularly nonfeasance for failure to repair roads. The court, how-
ever, dramatically limited this immunity by reasoning that the
immunity expired after a certain period of time, a period calculated
to run from when the city received notice of a dangerous hole in the
street. Detroit's failure to repair the road within thirty days of this
notice waived the city's governmental immunity.' 3 This approach
permits limited recovery for governmental failure to repair. Thus,
some plaintiffs can be compensated without opening the govern-
ment to fiscal ruin.
Failure to Promote Constitutionally Protected Civil Rights
This area of public nonfeasance has been litigated most exten-
sively in recent years and has promoted more commentary than any
other single issue in the law. Many actions for public nonfeasance
involve suits against state officers for violations of federal civil
rights, actions brought under section 1983 of the Federal Civil
Bridgewater, 107 N.J. 163, 151 A. 603 (1930) (city not liable when it failed properly to support
walls of gravel pit which collapsed on plaintiff); Clausen v. Eckstein, 7 Wisc. 2d 409, 97
N.W.2d 201 (1959) (officer escaped liability because of discretionary function exception after
failing to remove pile of dirt from road which caused collision). See also cases collected in
Annot. 45 A.L.R.3d 875 (1972). The principle behind the cases limiting the liability of the
public officer has been codified repeatedly in statutes. See, e.g., Local Government and
Government Employee Tort Immunity Act, ILL.REv.STAT. ch. 85, §§1-101 et seq. (1975). See
generally Eglit, Fritzsche & Muller, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 51 CI. KENT L. REV.
337, 410 (1974).
132. 6 N.J. 400, 79 A.2d 37 (1951).
133. 77 Eng. Rep. 798 (K.B. 1693). See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
134. 1 Mich. App. 87, 134 N.W.2d 375 (1965).
135. The concept of waiver of governmental immunity discussed in Sable is analogous to
the waiver of sovereign immunity alleged by the plaintiffs in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974). Jordan alleged, but the Court did not accept, the proposition that Illinois had
waived its sovereign immunity by accepting federal funds. The Court said that a waiver had
to be explicitly acknowledged by the defendant governmental unit.
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Rights Act of 1871.'11 Because of the massive treatment of this sub-
ject by the commentators, section 1983 actions will be treated in this
paper in only the most summary and preemptory manner. 13
The 1871 Act, now section 1983, provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other persons
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the person injured in an action of law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceedings for redress.13 ,' 31
Generally, state inaction or nonfeasance, without more, has not
been accorded the status of a constitutional violation. Estelle v.
Gamble, 0 decided by the Supreme Court in 1976, established the
test for determining whether government nonfeasance would be cog-
nizable under section 1983. Gamble, imprisoned in a state peniten-
tiary, filed a handwritten complaint in federal court alleging that
prison authorities had failed to provide him with adequate medical
treatment. His complaint detailed, however, that he had in fact
been treated repeatedly, though perhaps less than adequately, by
the prison authorities. Although the Court concluded in dictum that
the government has an obligation to provide medical care for those
whom it incarcerates, Gamble was not allowed to recover because
his complaint did not show the requisite intentional failure to act."'
"[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners
constitutes" cruel and unusual punishment."' However,
"inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be
said to constitute a 'wanton infliction of unnecessary pain' or to be
'repugnant to the conscience of mankind.' 3 Nonfeasance appar-
ently will not produce section 1983 liability, at least at the present
time.
136. 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1976). This statute is exhuastively analyzed in Note, Developments
in the Law - Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1133 (1977).
137. See, e.g., Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitutional
Violations, 89 HARV. L. REv. 922 (1976); Comment, Injunctive Relief Against Municipalities
under §1983, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 389 (1970); Annot., 43 L.ED.2d 833 (1976); Annot., 14 A.L.R.
FED. 608 (1973).
138. 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1976).
139. Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitutional Violations, 89
HARV. L. REV. 922, 954 (1975).
140. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
141. Id. at 103.
142. Id. at 104.
143. Id. at 105-06.
19791
Loyola University Law Journal
CONCLUSION
The traditional law regarding the tort liability of governmental
units and public officers is clearly repositioning itself in light of the
tremendous increase in the size of government and in the scope of
public activities. This realignment apparently reflects a fundamen-
tal shift in legal attitude. Combining a realization that larger gov-
ernment compels greater judicial intrusion into the operations of
government with a desire to implement the developing social con-
sciousness of modern society, the courts have changed the tradi-
tional answers to the three basic questions of duty examined in this
article.
Apparently, the various tests for determining public liability do
not effectively resolve the question of when liability should be
placed on the government or officer for nonfeasance. The courts
themselves admit the confusion. The only fact that emerges from
analysis of the cases is this: though the various tests and distinc-
tions are devoid of internal consistency, each of these tests appears
to be one step in an evolutionary progress toward broader public
liability.'
What the next step in the progression of public liability will be is
unclear. The commentators suggest that the next step should be
nothing less than the standard of negligence; both governmental
and sovereign immunity should be abolished." ' '" This view sug-
gests that the implementation of private negligence rules in public
actions is the logical conclusion to the process of gradual step-by-
step rejection of the immunities. A troubling concern arises, how-
ever, when the evolutionary progression analysis detailed above is
applied to this suggested "final" step: is a standard of simple negli-
gence without immunity the conclusion or is it merely another step
in the way to the conclusion? The Supreme Court in Dalehite v.
United States hinted at this concern in rejecting the plaintiffs at-
tempt to impose strict liability on the government for the explosion
of fertilizer bags.
Although the Supreme Court presently rejects strict liability as a
144. The proposition that in the area of public nonfeasance the courts have moved from
one distinction to another in a series of steps is suggested in Elgin v. District of Columbia,
337 F.2d 152, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
145. E.g., K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§25.01-.05 (3d ed. 1972); L. JAFFE,
JUDICLAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 195-96 (Abr. student ed. 1965).
146. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 44-45 (1953). In Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797
(1972), the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the imposition of strict liability in an action
based on damages caused by a sonic boom. See generally B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
570 (1976) (advocating strict liability against the government).
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basis for public liability, it is not likely that the courts will stop at
the application of private negligence principles in public actions.
The evolutionary progress in the expansion of public liability has
rejected each previous step as insufficient when a broader standard
of liability has been available. Speculation that the progress will
continue is therefore not unfounded. 147
As public tort liability has expanded, most courts have not seen
fit to analogize cases involving one type of public nonfeasance to
cases involving another type. Nonetheless, the underlying facts of
numerous disparate areas of public liability involve identical policy
considerations. It should not be long before courts begin the search
for precedent outside of the individual areas presumably presented
by the facts of the case.
147. Strict liability, that is, liability based solely on a cause and effect relationship be-
tween act and injury, conceivably is not the last step in the progression. It is possible to
speculate that the government will ultimately absorb "absolute liability" in tort, and com-
pensate victims for any tortious injury regardless of the lack of immediate involvement by
tlfe government. An example of this type of liability is suggested by the various statutes
allowing compensation from public funds for injuries suffered by private individuals at the
hands of violent criminals. See generally Lamborn, Scope of Programs for Governmental
Compensation of Victims of Crime, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 21.
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